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BIRTHING INTO DEATH: STORIES OF JEWISH PREGNANCY FROM THE 
HOLOCAUST 
 
STACI JILL ROSENTHAL 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates the stories of Jewish women and men living in Europe during 
the Holocaust who made decisions related to pregnancy, abortion, birth, and ‘parenting’ in 
ghettos, concentration camps, and in hiding. By reviewing existing, publicly accessible 
survivor testimonies, and by interviewing still-living survivors, I analyze the various ways 
Jewish women and men used available but limited forms of reproductive assistance to 
preserve their own lives and to secure the safety of their unborn or born children. Jewish 
women and their doctors or other ad-hoc medical providers weighed the risks of possible 
illness or diseases resulting from clandestine care against the seemingly greater or graver risk 
of Nazi exposure. By highlighting stories from Holocaust survivors who speak about 
experiences receiving or providing reproductive “health care” during the Holocaust, this 
study emphasizes what survivors say about seeking or providing abortions under conditions 
they might not have otherwise accepted, pursued, or suggested. 
Women who became pregnant during the Holocaust embody the unspeakable 
dilemma of “birthing into death,” as reproduction often meant murder for Jewish mothers. 
Pregnant Jewish women and their partners, the medical providers who attended to them, and 
their witnesses during the Holocaust all have unique perspectives on their own in-the-
moment responses to pregnancy under extreme conditions. Their testimonies speak to how 
	  	   viii 
the decisions they made involved Jewish cultural notions of childrearing in Europe during the 
time of the Holocaust, and to the complex shaping of traumatic memory. 
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I’ve spoken with death 
and so 
I know 
the futility of things we learn 
a discovery I made at the cost 
of a suffering 
so intense 
I keep on wondering 
whether it was worth it. 
 
 
 Charlotte Delbo 
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Preserving Death at the New England Holocaust Memorial  
The New England Holocaust Memorial (NEHM), “a beacon of memory and 
hope,” sits on Congress Street next to City Hall near Faneuil Hall and Haymarket 
District. A strange mixture of government buildings and landmark historical attractions 
like the Freedom Trail, The Aquarium and The Boston Harbor conceal the memorial park 
so that visitors easily miss it in their initial approach. At first sight of the six, single 
standing 54-feet-high glass towers which occupy only one city block, most people’s quiet 
city park suddenly becomes, quite literally, a standing testament to death. 
As a Docent to the memorial, I participated in a training session with its 
overseeing organization, the Jewish Community Relations Council (JCRC) of Greater 
Boston. This meeting took place in February, at an office building downtown. To travel 
up to the meeting floor I had to pass through strict security. With two profound Israeli 
flags in each back corner, the experience was not unlike entering the Israeli embassy. But 
this experience – the meeting, and all the times I spent in the space after – allowed for me 
to become familiar with a new part of town. I even eventually began biking along the 
Charles River and into the crowd that surrounds the monument’s radius for miles. Trips 
like these became a fieldwork ritual. I made a conscious effort to learn not only about the 
space’s history, but also to observe its visitors. 
Giving tours to students—usually middle school aged tourists passing through on 
fieldtrips—extended my time there by hours, so I interacted with it’s sights and sounds. I 
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initially revered my time there, thinking of it as sacred. In my field notes journal, I 
reflect: 
The longer I am here the more I can see. I am aware of the silence in the 
monument, but the noise that exists around it. There was someone who 
walked through and took a picture of a random stone. I assumed he wasn’t 
Jewish, and felt myself annoyed at his unawareness of the monument’s 
importance. Then I corrected myself for judging his randomness. Perhaps 
each visitor creates his own symbolism and significance. Perhaps that’s 
the beauty of such a setting. 
SR Fieldnotes, June 4, 2015 
 
I created meaning through my observations, and could tell that others did, too. I watched 
as men, women, and children of all ethnicities took pictures of the iconic tattoos engraved 
into the pillars’ glass. I admired those who acknowledged the word “SHOAH” etched 
into a gravestone at the entrance, mostly there to welcome guests but also there to teach 
them. 
Above all else, I noticed that the visitors find most compelling the steam vents at 
the bottom of each of the six towers. This is the heart of the monument, the only physical 
structures to the memorial space. They stand in the middle of perfectly polished grass and 
stones neatly placed alongside the borders, symbolically representing Jewish tradition of 
placing rocks upon gravestones. It is simple and bare compared to other national and 
worldwide sights of Holocaust remembrance. And yet here, at the center of the hustling 
part of town, silence permeates the entire block as if locking in the presence of death. 
The Docent manual from my training stresses the aim to not simply memorialize 
the Holocaust, but the events that took place in death camps specifically. Unlike 
concentration camps and forced labor camps, where people received very little food and 
sleep under extreme conditions until they died “naturally,” Death camps had gas 
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chambers and crematoria literally as factories of the mass production of death. Stanley 
Saitowitz, the memorial’s lead architect, appears on NEHM’s website explaining the 
design of the memorial. He says, 
The memorial to darkness is built with light. The construction began on 
Yom Hashoah, Holocaust Memorial Day. The horror of the Holocaust is 
reenacted in the brutal cutting of all the trees on half the site. These 
stumps remain. 
 
Six pits are dug and lined with black concrete. At the bottom of each pit is 
a glowing fire. 
 
Six glass towers are raised above. Etched on the glass towers are 
MILLIONS of numbers that flicker with light. On the walls of each tower, 
a memory of a survivor from the camp is etched. Between the towers, a 
line of text locates the Holocaust in historical context. 
 
At the two entries are didactic panels, one outlining the chronology of 
events that led to the Wannsee Conference and the horrific propositioning 
of establishing the factories of death this memorial marks, the other 
quoting Pastor Martin Niemoller, who placed responsibility for such even 
[sic] in the hands of every individual. 
 
As visitors walk along this path, entering the towers, they are tattooed with 
the shadows of numbers, and trapped momentarily in a theater of horror. 
 
On the black granite ramps is incised REMEMBER. Each of the six 
burning chambers is named after one of the six death camps constructed in 
Poland, factories whose product was death: CHELMO, TREBLINKA, 
MAJDANEK, SOBIBOR, AUSCHWITZ-BIRKENAU, [and] BELZEC. 
 
At the scale of the city, the memorial has another role: path, colonnade 
and frame create urban space, defining edges and relationships with the 
buildings and city beyond. These six towers are emblems of faith, a 
covenant of trust that memorializes a collective evil.  
 
From these words we can acknowledge his rich ritualization of death from within the 
establishment and construction of the monument’s space. It has become a symbol of 
death for so many living survivors, and they return to this death at each visit.  
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 On one visit to the memorial, months into my time there, I met a group of visitors 
from Texas. Over fifty children in sixth grade and their adult chaperones, all standing on 
the corner entrance closest to the glass towers waiting to begin. After introducing myself, 
I went through my usual beginning spiel, as the manual outlines, but then I deviated from 
the script and encouraged the group to walk through the monument individually. 
“Though we can’t help but walk as a group, maybe close your eyes or avoid your 
friends,” I suggested. “Try to make this at least an individual experience.” Then I took 
my own advice. I made a conscious effort to walk through the first tower, close my eyes, 
and embrace the warm texture and sweet smell of the steam coming from the grates under 
my feet. I stood in place, closed my eyes, and tried to feel the sensation on my body. 
Then I opened my eyes and kept walking through the first column, reuniting with cool 
fresh air and a summer breeze from the open space. I read the quotations on the walls 
leading into the next pillar, many of them I recognized from iconic Holocaust literature 
and film. 
As the engravings on the walls changed from the words of iconic survivors to 
number tattoos, I closed my eyes and this time tried to imagine the gas chambers, where 
people’s bodies met the fate of not steam, but zyklon b, the poisonous gas Nazis used to 
exterminate hundreds of bodies at once. This time someone brushed my shoulder and 
kept walking, forcing me out of my trance and, immediately, taking my steam with him 
as he walks through the “crematoria’s” exit. “This was not their experience,” I thought, 
“their only way out was through the chimneys.” The monument teaches us that, does it 
not? Suddenly I found myself enraged at the attempt to recreate an experience only felt 
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by those in the actual gas chambers—the real ones. I suddenly found the monument’s 
task too large, and that the specific experience of walking directly into death was limited 
to those who felt it. And, unfortunately, we have limitations in the ways we can fully 
understand it. 
This epigraph from my time at the space invites us to think about a life and death 
paradox in Holocaust narratives. Over time, and after much thought, I reframed my 
opinion about the monument. I realized that those who founded it preserved in time their 
face-to-face encounters with the angel(s) of death, and from this future generations will 
benefit. The extent to which NEHM can capture, in some capacity, the experience for 
visitors to feel the gray boundaries between life and death that existed in the Holocaust 
frames another important question I answer throughout later chapters, namely what can 
we learn from these experiences today?  
 
Deathlife, and the Holocaust Survivor 
Lawrence Langer wrote the epigraph to French political prisoner Charlotte 
Delbo’s influential memoir Auschwitz and After, in which he introduces a simple 
anecdote from her post-war reflection: 
Charlotte Delbo told me that several years after the war the government 
held a commemorative ceremony for some men and women who died in 
the Nazi camps. While sitting in the audience, she was stunned to hear 
from the podium her own name being read. It seemed a bizarre perversion 
of her own discovery that one could die in Auschwitz and still be alive. 
Her paralysis lasted only an instant; then she modestly raised her hand and 
murmured, “Non, Monseur: présente.“ 
-(Langer 1995:xviii). 
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The words “it seemed like a bizarre perversion of her own discovery that one could die in 
Auschwitz and still be alive” suggest that, for Delbo, she never fully returned from the 
death that engulfed Auschwitz. Though Delbo lived, part of her also died. 
 In addition to experiencing this phenomenon at the monument, I also 
heard this sentiment amongst the Holocaust survivors I got to know in Boston. Many 
survivors referenced a “rebirth” after the Holocaust, implying that with liberation came a 
revival from death. One key informant whose birthday falls out on the day Auschwitz 
was liberated even told me, “I was born on this day and then re-born on this day!” But 
not all survivors felt fully alive. Lawrence Langer originally this deathlife, “a not 
uncommon attitude among many who had endured the lethal universe of Nazi 
oppression.” Langer explains further his concept of deathlife: 
As someone who has outlived the camps, the survivor moves further from 
death: but as someone who has returned to the realm of the living, he or 
she moves closer to it. This paradox remains unresolved in most Holocaust 
commentary, but it is an issue we cannot afford to ignore…. The Book of 
Common Prayer reminds us that ‘in the midst of life we are in death,’ 
though modern history has forced a radical shift to our understanding of 
that sentiment. A sober cue to the human spirit about its brief earthly 
sojourn has grown into a shattering secular vision of global slaughter for 
which Auschwitz has become an archetypal center (Langer 2006: xiv).  
 
Langer’s deathlife argues that a survivor of the Holocaust lives both in life and in death. 
The stories I present in future sections of women who became pregnant in the Holocaust 
echo this theme in both their experiences during the Holocaust and in their post-
Holocaust recovery. Death dangerously became embedded in the decisions women had to 
make while bearing new life. Many women who lost their children reflect similar themes 
to Delbo—that they “died” as well, even though they clearly lived to tell the tale. Other 
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survivors construct these decisions as times in which they became stronger—points of 
survival. I explore this dichotomy as one aspect of my research question. 
 
 
Thesis Overview 
In the pages to follow, I argue how women who became pregnant during the 
Holocaust embody the unspeakable dilemma of “birthing into death.” I use ethnographic 
methodology (extended, open-ended interviews and participant observation) to argue that 
reproduction often meant murder for Jewish mothers, whom the Nazis forbade to 
reproduce. Yet it also offered a sign of life to individuals on the verge of annihilation. I 
show how my informants’ stories illuminate this terrible paradox and reveal the 
conditions that created their experiences and decisions—sometimes self-inflicted abortion 
and sometimes birth. I also write about how analyzing their interviews, conducted 
decades after the events, uncovers the  complex shaping of traumatic memory. 
 My background chapter introduces the context of pregnancy in the Holocaust by 
regarding Jewish notions of reproduction at this time. I start by comparing how a mother 
and her son have two different ways of thinking about his birth in the Holocaust, and 
move into a discussion of the Holocaust’s impact on changes in childrearing practices—
and access to childrearing related medical care. With a discussion of testimony, I 
introduce the historical and psychoanalytic lenses through which scholars analyze 
Holocaust testimonies, and I end with interdisciplinary approaches to understanding the 
concept of embodied trauma. 
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 After a description of my methods, I move into Chapter Four, “Doing 
Abortions…Saving Lives,” in which I argue that in order to survive, pregnant women 
often opted for abortions they might not otherwise considered. In some cases this went 
against their religious identity. However, for everyone, choosing life in many cases also 
meant choosing death. Therefore, in this chapter I play with concepts of agency by 
looking closer into “choice,” claiming that we do not have the necessary language to 
discuss the decisions women made to have abortions in the Holocaust because it 
contained a world unlike anything we know today. I argue that the women who had 
abortions, and the doctors that offered them, did not “decide” so much as “act” in 
response to the circumstances that lay beyond their control. These stories also provide 
chilling insights into this widely underexplored experience faced by so many women. 
 In Chapter Five, “The Death Camp’s Birth Car,” I continue looking into a 
redefinition of “agency” by turning specifically to Lawrence Langer’s Choiceless Choice, 
to argue a different model of conceptualizing agency in these birth stories, as women who 
gave birth had to make decisions about the actual physical act of delivery as well as 
caring for their children. I use Primo Levi’s Gray Zone concept and Agamben’s Bare Life 
to point to the idea that we might not have the means to understand the “choiceless 
choice” situations in which pregnant women made certain decisions if we rely on our 
current ethical code. This chapter also draws into question the role of memory in the 
shaping of traumatic birth stories from the Holocaust, looking at one specific testimony in 
which the reshaping of the story seemed inaccurate and inconsistent. 
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Chapter Six, “Alternative Forms of Caregiving,” follows a similar pattern to the 
previous chapters. I use the concept of gendered Holocaust narratives to explore the 
changing roles of caregivers during the Holocaust. I offer what I consider “alternative” 
forms of mothering in the concentration camps, and also regard the changing role of 
doctor as caregiver, since many doctors, nurses, and midwives refused to help pregnant 
Jewish women in times of need. 
 My research question asks how we might redefine terms like “agency,” 
“survival,” and “trauma” when analyzing stories of women who became pregnant, in 
such an extreme life and death paradox. These terms do not apply neatly to each story, 
and with an ethnographic perspective, we can listen to the words of the informants and 
deduce what they say about their own experiences. 
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BACKGROUND 
Pregnancy and Holocaust Testimonies 
 
 
 
Introduction 
In his testimony, USCSF survivor Alfred van der Poorten criticizes his parents’ 
decision to conceive a Jewish baby in Amsterdam on May 15, 1942: 
I’ve questioned at least in more recent years the absurdity of having a 
child two years after the, um, occupation…and the only answer I’ve really 
ever gotten is ‘well we planned to have a child every two years and so we 
did.’ It doesn’t sort of make sense to me…. I think whenever I’ve pressed 
this kind of question somehow the conversation has gotten diverted. So I 
can barely say ‘I don’t understand at all.’ It can’t have been normal… 
 
 He doubts his mother’s explanation, particularly the part where she explains to 
him “well we planned to have a child every two years and so we did.” He remarks on the 
“absurdity” of giving birth at a time when Nazis attempted to execute the entire Jewish 
population and cannot “understand at all” the circumstances under which his parents 
conceived a child. Yet testimonies show that many Jewish women gave birth in an 
environment that inflicted physical and emotional suffering and a threat of imminent 
death. 
His mother, Marianne van der Poorten, separately describes her experience of 
conceiving and delivering a child during the Holocaust.  In her own testimony she further 
justifies her pregnancy, responding indirectly to her son. She says:  
You didn’t realize it would take that long. And we never wanted one child. 
And we thought because also my husband was not that young anymore… 
but later on we thought it was a little bit stupid. But we were not the only 
one [sic]. 
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From these words, one might assume that Marianne van der Poorten weighed the benefits 
of having a second child against the increased risks and threats of death. After all, “[her] 
husband was not that young anymore” and “[they] never really wanted one child.” 
Poorten can rationalize her decision to conceive and give birth while living under Nazi 
occupation in the Netherlands. Even while admitting how “[she] did not realize it would 
take that long,” and mentioning that “years later [they] thought it was a little bit stupid,” 
her explanation suggests a semblance of self-validation in her choice to give birth and 
raise a child despite the dangers of the time. “But we were not the only one,” she adds, 
insinuating that others in the same position might similarly validate this decision. 
As mysterious and vexing as Poorten finds his mother’s decision, few studies of 
Holocaust testimonies even mention women’s reproductive choices during the Holocaust. 
Anthropological understandings of Holocaust trauma have yet to discuss the lived 
experiences of those who became pregnant or of those who were born during the 
Holocaust.  Joan Ringelheim hypothesizes that “talk about sex or sexual exploitation may 
be too intimate for some; talk about genocide of Jewish women and children, too 
frightening” (Ringelheim 1998: 349). She notes that “if we look at the experiences 
specific to women, however, we must include the sexual, and we must eventually come 
to the death and killing rates” (Ringelheim 1998: 349). Doris L. Bergen similarly argues 
that studying gender, sex, and sexuality “contributes to an integrated history by providing 
access to the horror via things intimate” (Bergen 2013: 26). She writes: 
Paying attention to sex, to bodies, brings out the pain in immediate ways 
that one can feel within one’s own body. Such familiarity can tip toward 
banality or can block analysis by eliciting the desire to close one’s eyes—
or the book. But when pursued with courage and rigor, emotional 
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identification can also cut through abstraction to open up insights (Bergen 
2013: 26). 
 
Ringelheim and Bergen point to a gap in existing research on women’s experiences in the 
Holocaust, a gap which can be closed by documenting and studying what women have to 
say about making decisions regarding birth and childrearing in Nazi Europe. 
The exchange between mother and son demonstrates one of the many ways in 
which survivors of the Holocaust who became pregnant and gave birth in life-threatening 
circumstances discuss the details of their experiences later in life. While different 
scholars have examined the theme of trauma in Holocaust testimony, the intersection of 
pregnancy and reproduction in the context of the Holocaust remains seemingly 
unexplored. An investigation into reproduction in the Holocaust adds new layers to 
notions of trauma, as the radical tensions of birth, life, and death illuminate the 
juxtaposition between bringing new life into a world full of murderous intent. 
The difference in the ways Alfred van der Poorten and Marianne van der Poorten 
each explain her act of getting pregnant at this time demonstrate how mother and son 
represent the experience of birth in the Holocaust differently. Alfred van der Poorten 
“cannot understand” why one would consider becoming pregnant in a tumultuous and 
dangerous environment, and appears to ignore his mother’s justifications for doing so. 
Marianne van der Poorten herself provides ostensibly rational explanations for her 
decision to have a second child under Nazi occupation, albeit balancing confidence with 
defensiveness. Offering little comfort to her son, Marianne van der Poorten’s words raise 
fascinating questions about how women made decisions about pregnancy and birth in 
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Nazi Europe and how engaging in the testimony process (re)represents these past 
experiences in present time. 
 
 
 
Framing our Context: (Some) Jewish Notions of “Mothering” 
The cultural contexts of Jewish childbearing during the Holocaust illuminate 
some meaning behind particular survivor testimonies I highlight in future pages. Before 
Hitler’s rise to power, and even thereafter, Jewish families in Europe valued childrearing 
as one of their highest cultural priorities. Holocaust Studies professor David Patterson 
explains how in Judaism the mother “represents not the primeval but the immemorial, the 
remembrance of something that transforms everything, prior to everything, and forever 
afterward into something meaningful” (Patterson 2013: 166-167). While his writing does 
somewhat essentialize historical Jewish tradition around motherhood, his work does 
respond to the belief in Judaism that motherhood is sacred (Patterson 2013: 167). 
Jewish texts also highlight sacred aspects of Jewish mothering by and articulating 
the belief that in bringing new life into the world the Jewish mother also bears the Torah, 
the “Etz Chayim,” (tree of life) which sustains all life (Proverbs, 3:18; Zohar III, 65b). In 
this sense, Jewish faith deeply attaches to the spirituality surrounding childbirth; women 
intertwine constructions of female identity with culturally and religiously enriched 
notions of motherhood. As in Marianne Van Der Poorten’s testimony, women wanted 
children, and continued to want them throughout increasingly dangerous conditions. But 
the eventual Nazi attack on Jewish existence appeared drastically in a direct threat to the 
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life of the Jewish mother and to the life of their unborn children changed the ways in 
which women became pregnant and cared for their children. 
Before and during the Holocaust, many Jewish women highly revered the 
religious act of conceiving and bearing a new generation. “Mothering” still plays a 
profound role in the cultural construction of female Jewish identities, even if not 
ritualized in a religious sense. I do note in later sections that many women, entirely 
secular, valued mothering separate from Jewish tradition altogether. But, because Nazis 
persecuted Jews for their ethnic, religious, cultural or biological identities as Jews, we 
therefore must consider some of these stories as persecution against Jewish 
motherhood—those at least from the women who felt persecuted themselves, and express 
it in their interviews.  
We must consider the extent of a pregnant Jewish woman’s conflict in relation to 
Nazi reproductive ideology, when Hitler passed laws reflecting his own notions of female 
identity and motherhood. Bergen writes: 
[Hitler] regarded women’s bodies as important to the state, because they 
produced new generations of soldiers and breeders. But women’s bodies 
in Hitler’s view could also be the floodgates to racial impurity, the means 
through which supposed pollutants entered the Aryan bloodstream 
(Bergen2009: 39). 
 
Bergen continues to note how Hitler reinforced his ideas of anti-Semitism through his 
own sexist values, and “used anti-woman images and vocabulary to belittle Jews and 
other so-called enemies” (Bergen 2009: 39). 
 Tessa Chelouche suggests that in the early 1930s, the Nazis “forbade abortion in 
order to preserve ‘healthy’ German unborn, but allowed, even encouraged, the 
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destruction of non-German or hereditarily ill German unborn” (Chelouche 2007: 203). 
Essentially, Hitler sanctioned abortions of Jewish fetuses to preserve his own ideas of 
racial superiority. At the same time, he made it illegal for Aryan women to abort their 
pregnancies. She writes further that during the early 1940s, Nazis issued a decree banning 
all births in some of the ghettos, threatening death to the whole family and to any Jewish 
doctor or midwife who assisted in a birth (Chelouche 2007: 204). Women who became 
pregnant had to make decisions to save their own lives, the lives of their unborn children, 
and the lives of those who seemed willing to help them: 
The women and their doctors were both trapped within a terrible medical 
paradox.... Jewish women were placed in situations of double jeopardy, 
Jewish women doctors were confronted with a ‘triple jeopardy.’ As 
women and doctors, and as Jews, they were confronted with dilemmas, 
both personal and professional, that had to be solved under the most 
horrific circumstances (Chelouche 2007: 204-205). 
 
Within a short time, women who might have eagerly conceived and birthed children 
began to either consider abortion and forced miscarriages as safer options, or construct 
new plans for the safe delivery of their children. Of course many women did not have 
quite as many options to consider, and had to make decisions with drastically limited 
support. They made choices in the context of deteriorating conditions and the 
unpredictable resources afforded to them. Chelouche cites Dr. Adelaide Hautval, who 
wrote: 
Nobody could live during the nightmare years who in some instances was 
not forced to break with the rules of traditional behavior. To be or not to 
be was the question. All of us, including myself, were sometimes in 
situations in which we had to make abnormal decisions (Chelouche 2007: 
204). 
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Essentially, the setting of the Holocaust forced families to redefine what it meant to have 
children in an evolving, uncertain environment that threatened to eradicate the very 
concept of Jewish reproduction. Katharina von Kellenbach argues “the Holocaust 
targeted women in their capacities as mothers because the Nazis intended to destroy the 
possibility of a Jewish future” (von Kellenbach 1999: 30). Von Kellenbach further 
mentions that, as an act of resistance, some Jewish women gave birth in the midst of the 
Holocaust “motivated by religious and political beliefs” and, she claims, they “acted in 
defiance of extermination policies” (von Kellenbach 1999: 30). These women risked the 
dangers of pregnancy in order claim their bodies. 
 
 
 
What We Talk About When We Talk About Testimony   
I consider both the archived testimonies I watched during data collection and my 
own interviews with living survivors as “Holocaust Testimonies,” and using this term 
begs for a consideration of its meaning. Miriam Webster’s online dictionary defines 
“testimony” as “proof or evidence that something exists or is true.” The field of 
Holocaust Studies today addresses that very notion with regards to Holocaust testimonies, 
since survivors preserved their stories over time as their memories evolved away from 
their original experiences. To what extent do their stories offer evidence of a historical 
reality? How might they continue to do so long after survivors are no longer living?  
The late 1970s and the early 1990s saw a proliferation of video Holocaust 
testimony archives in the United States. The Yale Fortunoff archive collected interviews, 
followed by the Steven Spielberg interviews of the USC Shoah Foundation, which 
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number more than 60,000 interviews. Joanne Rudof similarly observes that researchers 
have long employed the act of recording testimonies, and that psychologists and 
interdisciplinary researchers started documenting survivor testimony immediately after 
liberation in the late 1940s (Rudof 2006: 452). In order to understand the data I present in 
the following pages, I offer different social scientific ways to consider the term 
“testimony.” 
Bhaskar Sarkar and Janet Walker refer to the emergence of video archives in the 
late twentieth and twenty-first centuries as an “era of witness” (Sarkar and Walker 2010: 
1), and argue that the increased popularity of archived testimonies correlated directly 
with a cultural transformation and a budding interest in “witnessing.”  Other social 
scientific considerations of different testimonies processes also illuminate connections 
between testimony and culture. For example, Alan Wieder studied testimonies from the 
hearings Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and other South African apartheid 
oral history projects. He identifies them as culturally infused methods of constructing 
meaning in an experience: 
The stories force us to ask questions of the spoken versus the unspoken 
and whether or not there are words to describe certain atrocities.... [they] 
also ask us to consider testimony for meaning as well as experiences or 
events. While the human descriptions of particular events are important, 
the personal meaning of the events provides us with deep stories of 
individual and collective identity (Wieder 2004: 24). 
 
Wieder argues that testimonies from witnesses of historical atrocities lead us to consider 
“the past and the present” and to construct understandings of “personal stories that 
nurture a non-official collective point of view” (Wieder 2004: 24). In this light, 
testimonies generate a venue in which different people with different ideas of what 
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happened at a particular moment in time collect and assign meaning to individual or 
collective experiences.  
Phenomenologist Cheryl Mattingly discusses the intricacies in the process of 
constructing narratives. She refutes the idea that stories exist in particular chronologies 
by asserting that narrators often perform their stories (Mattingly 2010). She emphasizes 
that humans act in production of a desired outcome and theorizes that “because we plot, 
as actors, the structure of lived experience already contains a (partly) plotted shape” 
(Mattingly 2010: 813). She adds, “to say that narratives are lived before they are told…is 
to make a contentious claim” (Mattingly 2010: 811). Mattingly considers a testimony not 
as a representation of an experience but as part of the experience itself, and situates 
narratives in a non-temporal context. She argues that the act of providing the narrative is 
in itself part of the experience.  
 Anthropologist Jackie Feldman also discusses the survivor’s performance of 
Holocaust testimony. He presents the Israeli cultural phenomenon of pilgrimaging to 
Poland and writes about how teens identify with the survivors who accompany the 
groups, elders they call “witness survivors.” He says, 
These practices of embodied testimony build on Jewish practices, in which 
memory, zekher, has traditionally been transmitted from generation to 
generation…. The performances of witnesses…demonstrate the mutual 
influences of personal trauma, implicit cultural models of memory, ritual 
frames and practices, and national identity. The contents and significance 
of Holocaust testimony, both for the survivors as well as for the listeners, 
emerge through the performance of the voyage (Feldman 2009: 116-124). 
 
 He suggests that these students identify with the survivor by bearing the burden as 
symbolic descendants to “overcome death to live as a Jew in Israel” (Feldman 2009:116). 
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He claims that Holocaust testimony links these ‘witness survivors’ with young Israeli 
Jews—listeners who already share in the cultural, redemptive narrative of Israel—so that 
“students come to identify with the trauma of a Holocaust survivor” (Feldman 2009: 
124). I reference this last example because Professor Feldman, a former professor of 
mine from a 2009 semester abroad, highlights occurrences between survivor and 
“listeners” which other scholars of Holocaust stories claim exist between viewer and 
testimony. Among many questions, this thesis explores the idea that viewers become 
active carriers of traumatic Holocaust testimonies, when the question of “trauma” 
remains in the gray zone. 
 
Memory and its role in Shaping Holocaust Testimony 
In 1988, Dr. Lawrence Langer asked, “To whom shall we entrust the custody of 
the public memory of the Holocaust? To the historians? To the survivor? To the critic” 
(Langer 1988: 26)? He says, “All of them re-create the details and images of the 
event…and remind us that we are dealing with represented rather than unmediated 
reality.” This profound statement questions the value of a Holocaust testimony, and to 
whom the stories will be entrusted. Like Langer, a number of scholars address issues of 
trauma and memory in already existing Holocaust video archives. They examine what 
survivors remember, how traumatized they are, and how much the interviewer influences 
the story being told (Langer 1991, Felman and Laub 1999, Trezise 2008). In so doing, 
they discuss the ways in which people interviewers and survivors engage in a process, or 
experience, of giving a “Holocaust testimony.” 
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Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub, offer a therapeutic model with which to study 
the testimonies, assuming survivors are naturally traumatized. Critics such as Dr. 
Lawrence Langer contend that survivors are not “patients” who need to be cured. And 
some survivors themselves express frustration with the argument that they feel 
traumatized at all. In the pages to follow I will present testimonies of women who 
became pregnant in the Holocaust, and it seems important to understand the different 
ways in which witness of Holocaust testimony register the testimonial exchange. Memory 
affects the story, as most testimonies take place long after the events themselves. 
Scholars who focus on the role of memory in Holocaust testimony archives sometimes 
focus on the media employed without addressing the issue of the evolving role of 
memory itself (Shenker 2015). Thomas Trezise adds another layer to this difficult 
question when he reminds us that all trauma narratives are constructed between survivors 
and witnesses over time, making the interpretation of Holocaust testimony itself an 
evolving and complicated field. 
Analyzing Holocaust stories raises the question of how people account for 
memory within testimony. Psychiatrist Daniel Stern uses “episodic memory” to refer to 
the “perceptions, actions, and affects associated with the experience” as the main 
components of episode memories. He argues “episodes enter into memory as indivisible 
units and generally stand as a whole” (Janoff Bulman 2010:15). Traumatic memory 
claims traumatic situations preserve memories differently from episodic memory, in that 
traumatic memories do not enter a person’s psyche in the same manner as non-traumatic 
memories. Daniel Schacter, in his comprehensive analysis of different forms of memory, 
	   23	  
asserts that “we perform feats of memory naturally, even though the tasks require the 
virtually perfect operation of memory-retrieval systems with processes so complex that 
even the most advanced computer would not be able to carry out the assignment as easily 
and effectively as we do” (Schacter 2008:2). As we will see in the testimonies to follow, 
traumatic experiences make the already-complicated memory process that much more 
intricate. 
Women who became pregnant during the Holocaust offer a path through which 
we can consider the relationship between memory and Holocaust testimony. While the 
core of the Holocaust lies in the intersection of life and death, stories of pregnant women 
embody the unspeakable dilemma of “birthing into death.” Reproduction often meant 
murder for Jewish mothers, whom the Nazis forbade to reproduce, but also offered a sign 
of life to individuals on the verge of annihilation. In this thesis, I will illustrate how my 
informants’ stories illuminate this terrible paradox and reveal the conditions that created 
their dilemmas and decisions—sometimes self-inflicted abortion and sometimes birth. I 
will write about how analyzing their interviews, conducted decades after the events, 
uncover the  complex shaping of traumatic memory. 
 
 
What Do You Mean by “Trauma?” Psychoanalytic, Historical, and Social 
Scientific Applications of Holocaust Testimony  
 
 The concept of “trauma,” a deeply distressing experience, appears throughout 
Holocaust testimony and its resulting literature. Babette Rothschild writes that “memory 
has to do with the recording, storage, and recall of information perceived from the 
internal and external environments” (Rothschild 2000:26). It is known that “the brain 
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processes perceptions and stores them as thoughts, emotions, images, sensations, and 
behavioral impulses” and that this is referred to as “memory” (Rothschild 2000:26). She 
expands later in this piece on the different stages of memory, and writes about Somatic 
Memory in relation to PTSD: 
The implicit memory system is at the core of somatic memory. Individuals 
with PTSD suffer inundation of images, sensations, and behavioral 
impulses (implicit memory) disconnected from context, concepts, and 
understanding (explicit memory)…. Somatic memory relies on the 
communication network of the body’s nervous system. (Rothschild 
2000:37). 
 
Rothschild’s elaboration on the stages of memory—somatic memory in particular—
contextualizes the concept of trauma in an analysis of the bodily sensory system, as she 
writes “it is through the senses that one perceives the world…. It is through the senses 
that reality takes form” (Rothschild 2000: 39). 
 Psychoanalyst Jean Laplanche suggests that trauma “never comes from outside” 
(Caruth 2014:26). He further claims that a survivor of a traumatic experience feels the 
impact of the trauma only after revisiting the memory of the traumatic event. He writes: 
First, there is the implantation of something coming from the outside. And 
this experience, or the memory of it, must be reinvested in a second 
moment, and then it becomes traumatic. It is not the first act which is 
traumatic, it is the internal reviviscence of this memory that becomes 
traumatic (Caruth 2014:27). 
 
Similarly, psychiatrist and trauma-studies expert Bessel Van Der Kolk argues how 
trauma “is all about dissociation,” and notes that “the experience gets registered 
somewhere but doesn’t get integrated…because the integrative functions of the brain fall 
apart…. You see images, you have sensations, you have emotions, but it doesn’t get put 
together as something that happened a long time ago” (Caruth 2014:154). The survivor of 
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trauma, therefore, experiences very real, visceral emotions without much context; things 
she experiences in the body seem utterly “meaningless” (Caruth 2014:156). 
 Scheper-Hughes and Lock argue the notion of “the three bodies” as the 
“individual body, understood in the phenomenological sense of the lived experience of 
the body-self,” the “social body” as “the representational uses of the body as a natural 
symbol with which to think about nature, society, and culture,” and the “body politic” or 
“the regulation, surveillance, and control of bodies (individual and collective)” (Scheper-
Hughes and Lock 1987:7). They continue: 
Insofar as the body is both physical and cultural artifact, it is not always 
possible to see where nature ends and culture begins in the symbolic 
equations…. For the psychoanalyst social practices are always referred 
back to their unconscious representations of the experience of self with the 
body; symbolic anthropologists work in the opposite direction, taking the 
experiences of the body as representation of society (Scheper-Hughes and 
Lock 1987:19). 
 
Scheper-Hughes and Lock follow other structural anthropologists (Douglas) to imply that 
the human body embodies experience on three different levels. When it comes to 
processing traumatic experience, Van Der Kolk emphasizes the importance in ascribing 
words to a traumatized experience: 
… Language at least gives you a voice and provides the possibility of 
being in touch with the rest of the human race. Language at least offers the 
possibility that people will acknowledge what has happened to you, and 
believe you. But talking won’t make it go away—it makes a connection 
and it overcomes a terrible godforsaken loneliness that’s part of the trauma 
story. (Van der Kolk 2014:163). 
 
In this sense, van der Kolk’s theory works with Scheper-Hughes and Lock to support the 
claim that Holocaust survivors process their traumas viscerally, partly through the 
construction of testimony. 
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 In a different vain, Cathy Caruth argues that “survivors of traumatic experience 
thus provide what might be considered an unconscious historical testimony…. In so 
doing, they have made the study of and response to trauma into a site of historical 
memory and have, conversely, revised our notions of what it means to remember” 
(Caruth 2014: xiii). Thomas Tresize applies this logic to the identity of a Holocaust 
survivor, and reflects on the notion of the “traumatized survivor.” He writes: 
…I draw attention to the need for survivors to resort to conventional 
modes of communication in order to convey their traumatic experience to 
the world at large and to the no less forceful need for them to challenge 
convention so as to avoid either aestheticizing that experience or making 
too much sense of its senselessness (Trezise 2013: 3). 
 
Trezise conveys the sense that survivors engage in “conventional modes of 
communication” (testimonies or talk-therapy) in order to (re)produce their traumatic 
experience. Moreover, he argues that the current, popularized interest in Holocaust 
survivor testimony connects to a different cultural and intellectual fascination with the 
concept of trauma. Trezise does not stand apart from other literary and psychoanalytic 
scholars of Holocaust testimony who presume a strong embedding of trauma within the 
narrative itself, and within the process to construct it. Moreover, this connection between 
trauma and the survivor testimony relates to non-Holocaust-specific theories about 
trauma in the body, and how it affects the daily emotions of a survivor. 
 Michael Levine argues that listeners to stories of trauma become “participants” 
and a “co-owners” of the traumatic event. He writes that simply listening to the story 
places the listener partially in the trauma himself: 
My focus is less on the stories already in the [speaker’s] possession, less 
on the constative dimension of his or her testimony, than on what happens 
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in the very act of testifying, on what untold and unpossessed stories are 
unwittingly accessed and unconsciously performed in the very process of 
speaking toward another in the fluid space of transmission opened 
between the precariously fluctuating positions of the witness 
(Levine2006:4).  
 
The Holocaust testimonies I review in this thesis—those regarding stories of pregnancy, 
abortion, birth, and caregiving—offer spaces for survivors and their interviewers to 
document memories which otherwise might not come to the surface of one’s psyche. 
Because of the “fluctuating positions of the witness,” the speaker “[unconsciously 
performs] untold and unpossessed stories.” This leads us to a widely discussed question 
in Holocaust research, as scholars of psychoanalytic, historical, and literary 
understandings debate the extent to which the testimony as a process (re)presents the 
Holocaust experience as a “trauma drama” (Feldman 2010: 24). 
 An academic exchange between psychoanalyst and Holocaust survivor Dori Laub 
and literary critic Thomas Tresize speaks to this discussion. Laub writes: 
In listening to testimonies, and in working with survivors and their 
children, I came to believe… [that] survivors did not only need to survive 
so they could tell their story; they also needed to tell their story in order to 
survive. There is, in each survivor, an imperative need to tell and thus to 
come to know one’s story, unimpeded by ghosts from the past against 
which one has to protect oneself (Laub 1992:78).  
 
Laub suggests how, much like in an analytic setting, the process of testifying to trauma 
ultimately reacquaints the survivor with a life “unimpeded by ghosts from the past.” He 
assumes a Holocaust survivor suffers from a story she does not know until she engages in 
the act of providing testimony. Only then might she recognize her trauma and construct a 
coherent and realistic representation of her experience. 
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Laub also argues that, by engaging in the process of Holocaust testimony, a 
listener inevitably shares and co-constructs the trauma experienced by the Holocaust 
survivor. Specifically, he suggests that “by extension, the listener to trauma comes to be a 
participant and a co-owner of the traumatic event: through his very listening, he comes to 
partially experience trauma in himself” (Laub 1992:57). Laub offers ways in which the 
listener must behave during a testimony, so as to “be a guide and an explorer, a 
companion in a journey onto an uncharted land, a journey the survivor cannot transverse 
or return from alone” (Laub 1992:58-59). He insinuates that the listener ought to know 
his responsibilities in the testimony because he cannot avoid an active role in 
constructing a narrative of trauma with and for the survivor. By maintaining 
responsibilities in this process, the trauma becomes part of the listener; listener and 
survivor join together through the telling of a traumatic event, though only one of them 
experienced this trauma firsthand. 
 Thomas Trezise responds directly to Dori Laub for treating his interviewees like 
psychoanalytic patients, which requires a specific, limited kind of listening. He writes: 
Laub’s work suggests that the reception of the Holocaust survivor 
testimony requires not only attending to the voices of witnesses while 
remaining aware of one’s own but also attending, with equal self-
awareness, to the voices of other listeners…. In his very effort to promote 
a psychoanalytic historiography, Laub practices a listening just as 
selective as the kind he ascribes to historians. (Tresize 2008:8). 
 
By highlighting Laub’s listening as dependent on the psychoanalytic framework, Trezise 
claims Laub has just as many limitations in listening as he ascribes to historians. Tresize 
eventually critiques Laub for confusing his “multiple roles,” failing “to distinguish 
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adequately between them” (Tresize 2008: 22). He continues with an explanation as to 
why the roles must remain separate: 
The therapeutic efficacy of the [psychoanalytic] “working-through” can in 
fact be gauged by the degree to which it tempers the behavioral re-
enactment or “acting-out” of trauma, by the degree to which it moves the 
patient to shed a role scripted by others in order to assume authorship of 
his or her own story… such knowledge remains, however, essentially 
introspective…. The testimonial interview, on the other hand, can be said 
to ‘break the framework’ of psychoanalysis…it must presuppose on the 
part of the narrating witness a relatively unimpaired capacity for objective 
cognition (Tresize 2008:24). 
 
Trezise argues that testimonial exchanges construct different, non-therapeutic ways of 
viewing Holocaust survivor trauma. He writes, “it is rather a question of counteracting 
Laub’s own inclination… to promote a psychoanalytic to the detriment of a historical 
framework for the reception of testimony” (Tresize 2008: 24), as if to direct us to his 
assumption that the goal for an analytic session differs from that of a testimony. These 
opposing viewpoints contextualize “trauma” and the testimonial narration of trauma 
extraordinarily differently. Laub as psychoanalyst assumes the trauma of the survivor, 
while Trezise as historian questions it.  When reading stories from pregnant women 
during the Holocaust, we must look to the survivor and not the interviewer when 
determining the extent to which they appear traumatized. 
 
Anthropological Analyses of Trauma 
How, then, might an anthropological understanding of the Holocaust confront 
“trauma,” and the ways I use the term throughout later chapters. Might it be possible that 
the lived experiences themselves determine the degree to which one might claim the term 
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“traumatized” as part of their identity? Ethan Watters suggests that Americans have been 
“industriously exporting” ideas of mental illness for over thirty years, and that our 
“treatments have become the international standards” (Watters 2011: 2). He writes: 
It turns out that how a people in a culture think about mental illnesses—
how they categorize and prioritize the symptoms, attempt to heal them, 
and set expectations for their course and outcome—influences the diseases 
themselves. In teaching the rest of the world to think like us, we have 
been, for better and worse, homogenizing the way the world goes mad” 
(Watters 2011: 2).  
 
Moreover, Watters further claims how the promotion of Western constructions of mental 
health involves “a variety of cultural assumptions about human nature itself” (ibid 2010: 
4). He implies that Westerners, in their constructions of illness, shape beliefs about both 
which types of experiences are intrinsically traumatizing for a survivor, and about how 
best for them to handle such trauma.  
 Joel Robbins reflects on the anthropological (and interdisciplinary) interest in 
trauma during the 1990s, and states that “anthropology was… changing its relation to 
those it studied from one of analytic distance and critical comparison focused on 
difference to one of empathetic connection and moral witnessing based on human 
unity…. trauma was indeed becoming the bridge between cultures” (Robbins 2013: 453). 
He cites Fassin and Rechtman’s The Empire of Trauma to discuss at great length the 
“commonness of trauma” and writes: 
An important part of their argument is that it is the very commonness of 
trauma, its universal quality, that has made it so prominent as a lens 
through which to view the world. As trauma has come to be understood in 
the wake of the emergence of a widely shared cultural understanding of 
the shattering enormity of the Holocaust and then the establishment of the 
diagnostic category of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, [Fassin and 
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Rechtman] suggest, it represents ‘a suffering without borders, a suffering 
that knows no cultural barriers (Robbins 2013: 453). 
 
Robbins argues that anthropologists used the universality of trauma to define “a humanity 
without borders,” finding “a foundation for their science that allowed them to dispense 
with the notion of the other completely” (Robbins 2013 454). “Trauma,” as a term, 
became approachable. 
 Larry Langer regards the concept of “social suffering” as it relates to the 
Holocaust experience, and questions the motives behind applying a “traumatized” quality 
to the Holocaust testimony. He suggests that “a word like ‘suffering’ does little to help us 
imagine the modern disasters we are challenged to confront” and that “by calling the 
murder of European Jewry an example of mass suffering, we risk limiting its scope by 
merging it with prior models that are meager measures of the event” (Langer 1997: 47). 
Essentially, he argues that applying “social suffering” as a term for human misery leads 
to not much more than classification of the catastrophic event, without much 
understanding of its impact on a historical and individual level. He writes how “before 
we can present a program for dealing with human misery, we need to represent that 
misery” (Langer 1997: 47). We can derive from Langer a resistance in applying a general 
“traumatized” notion to the survivor. 
I talked extensively with my key informant—a child psychiatrist and world-
renowned psychoanalyst—about the word “trauma” and how scholars employ it in 
different Holocaust texts. I learned from her that “trauma” defines the actual event, not 
the symptoms thereafter. By highlighting the existence of trauma in Holocaust discourse, 
it seems imperative to underscore that not every survivor feels traumatized, and to imply 
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otherwise does a disservice to a person’s experience, as Langer argues above. I therefore 
urge us to consider “trauma” in a more anthropological light, allowing more room 
experiencing the symptoms of the event itself without the cultural repercussions and 
social stigma from identifying as a “trauma survivor.” 
Kleinman writes about PTSD: 
Personification has always been a preferred means of representing the 
trauma of suffering…. A group’s trauma is pictured in the bodies and 
words of individuals. The voices and facial expressions of individual 
victims or patients… do not show the interpersonal and community-wide 
effects of violence…. Social problems are transformed into the problems 
of individuals, collective experiences of suffering are made over into the 
personal experience of suffering, [and] social traumas are refigured…as 
psychological and medical pathologies (Kleinman 1997: 177). 
 
Kleinman’s words appear to respond directly to Lawrence Langer’s, as if they were in 
dialogue with one another. Kleinman argues that personalizing the trauma – making it 
individual – takes away from the collective experience of social suffering and transforms 
it into an individual diagnosis. Instead, I call for a combination of the two theories. 
 The Holocaust “world” stands apart from any other group, culture, or way of 
living we can understand; it remains locked in a very specific time and place and we must 
remember that we can learn from the stories only if we treat them as individual 
circumstances. But survivors of those traumatic experiences live sixty years later, 
identifying themselves to each other and to their communities as “survivors.” For some of 
them, talking about “trauma” becomes a way of articulating their experience, and others 
use a different vocabulary altogether. Kleinman’s use of the term “social suffering” 
provides a more adequate way of defining the symptoms and experiences faced by those 
who lived through the horrors of the event itself. I continue to draw upon “social 
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suffering” as the theme emrges in interviews with Boston Holocaust survivors, and 
specifically with interviews pertaining to pregnancy and childbirth at the time of the 
Holocaust. 
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METHODS AND RESULTS 
 
 
 
Introduction 
My research study investigated how Jewish women living in Europe during the 
Holocaust obtained medical attention related to pregnancy and birth in ghettos, 
concentration camps, and in hiding. I reviewed existing, publically accessible survivor 
testimonies alongside originally conducted interviews with living survivors in the Boston 
area, and their descendants, to develop an interdisciplinary analyses of the various ways 
Jewish women and men made decisions about available but limited forms of reproductive 
medicalization. I use the lens of reproduction to consider how Holocaust survivors 
conceptualized their experiences in terms of survival, but these stories also highlight the 
strong connection between life and death in the decisions women made. How did Jewish 
women and men weigh the risk of possible illness or disease resulting from clandestine 
care against the seemingly greater risk of Nazi exposure? How did they make decisions to 
abort their fetuses or kill their babies? What do survivors say about their internal 
justifications for the circumstances under which they gave birth (circumstances they 
might not have otherwise accepted, pursued, or suggested)? What do these experiences 
highlight about a Holocaust survivor narrative? 
 I did not ask these questions in the very beginning. My original goals of this 
research involved highlighting the value of this project in its ability to recognize the lived 
experiences of pregnant women and their partners during the Holocaust, those of their 
descendants, and those of the medical providers who attended to them. Over time I 
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noticed that my informants provide a unique consideration of their own in-the-moment 
responses to pregnancy under extreme conditions, and can speak to larger issues of how 
the decisions they made involved Jewish cultural notions of reproductive health, 
childbirth, and childbearing in Europe during the time of the Holocaust. Moreover, their 
stories consider memory’s role in the complex shaping of traumatic memory.  
My primary curiosity in this subject began in part from previous research studying 
Holocaust testimony and in part from personal relationships and community outreach 
work with Holocaust survivors in Boston, New York, and Israel. An mentor from my 
undergraduate studies at Brandeis University, Dr. Dawn Skorczewski, first introduced me 
to the Visual History Archives1 and subsequently familiarized me with the concept of 
testimony in a larger, more generalized understanding of the Holocaust. Continued 
conversations with her about embodied trauma and narrative formation would eventually 
shape the frame of my analyses. Working with Holocaust survivors in person and 
listening to their recorded stories further encouraged an attentiveness to understanding 
how survivors in general come to shape a retelling of their own experiences. From this 
work, I wanted to continue exploring more thoroughly how survivors of the Holocaust 
make sense of traumatizing conditions under which Nazis placed them, and if their 
individual circumstances potentially shape a multifaceted, collective Holocaust narrative.  
 While in Jerusalem during the Fall of 2013, I volunteered at Amcha, an Israeli 
Holocaust survivor outreach organization that pairs volunteers with survivors for weekly 
visits, elderly caregiving, and assistance with everyday routine. Having this background 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  	  USC	  Shoah	  Foundation’s	  digitally	  cataloged	  archive	  of	  historical	  “eyewitness”	  accounts;	  for	  more	  information	  visit	  https://sfi.usc.edu/about.	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coming into Boston University program encouraged a deeper interest in studying 
Holocaust survivor experience. In January of 2014, I left my first and only semester of 
Rabbinical school to return to Boston and enroll in a Master’s program of Medical 
Anthropology. In my first semester, I opted to register for a Public Health course on 
Jewish Bioethics that highlighted specific Jewish responses to Nazi actions as otherwise 
questionable acts against Halakha.2 During this seminar, I came across Rabbinical and 
religious responses to the notion of pregnancy during the Holocaust, and wondered how 
an anthropological approach to this subject might differently intellectualize the drastically 
varying situations under which Jewish women became pregnant and obtained medical 
care3 related to pregnancy, abortion, and birth in different settings throughout World War 
II. After that semester, I developed a project which explores further how survivors 
psychologically and physiologically understood those particular experiences related to 
reproduction. 
 Literature on the Holocaust mentions pregnancy by referencing how reproduction 
directly threatened the life of a Jewish woman (Chelouche, 2007). However, the literature 
sufficiently lacks testimonials regarding the varying conditions under which Jewish 
women became pregnant and the decisions they made thereafter. Additionally, existing 
related research mentions only briefly how survivors and descendants make sense of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Halakha	  refers	  to	  a	  Jewish	  legal	  system	  outlining	  how	  Jewish	  men,	  women,	  and	  children	  ought	  to	  behave	  in	  varying	  social,	  political,	  religious,	  and	  national	  circumstances,	  including	  during	  medical	  procedures	  or	  interactions	  with	  their	  bodies.	  The	  Jewish	  Virtual	  Library	  provides	  an	  articulate	  definition:	  	  http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/judaica/ejud_0002_0008_0_08206.html.	  3	  I	  should	  note	  that	  I	  use	  the	  term	  “medical	  care”	  because	  for	  some	  Jewish	  women,	  visits	  with	  practicing	  medical	  doctors	  was	  an	  option	  during	  this	  time.	  However,	  it	  is	  essential	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  for	  other	  women,	  actual	  medical	  care	  with	  practicing	  physicians	  was	  not	  an	  option	  due	  to	  lack	  of	  resources	  and/or	  increased	  violence	  and	  Anti-­‐Semitism.	  Therefore,	  their	  “medical	  care”	  sometimes	  drastically	  differed	  from	  the	  more	  ‘fortunate’	  circumstances.	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these experiences years later (Yaeger, 2006; Tresize, 2013; Rudof, 2006). On the onset of 
developing my research question, I expected to find survivors in Boston with whom I 
could speak about pregnancy and birth. I intended to conduct five interviews through 
which I could compare and contrast how survivors conceptualize and embody the 
reproductive experiences they went through and the decisions they made pertaining to 
their individual circumstances. I saw myself applying to work Boston-based outreach 
programs similar to Israel’s Amcha so that I can recruit through matched visitation. I also 
wanted to conduct participant observation at social gatherings designed specifically for 
survivors and commemorative events in Boston. While my research question and 
recruitment pool shifted with bureaucracy of qualitative data analysis, my 
anthropological investigation of Jewish reproduction throughout World War II 
nonetheless encourages an interdisciplinary analysis of the Holocaust by combining 
historical assumptions and theoretical or psychological frameworks. 
 
 
Eventual Research Design 
 I submitted a preliminary protocol to the Institutional Review Board in January 
2015 before offering my final submission in the following Spring. I felt an urgency to 
begin collecting data since my informant population was mostly made up of elderly 
Holocaust survivors, and I feared a few months might make a difference in who could 
meet with me. I gained “expedited” approval for my first proposal, and therefore I did not 
a full-board review. I conducted my first interview that winter with a key informant who 
remained active in shaping my project into a multi-layered analysis of the pregnancy in 
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the Holocaust. Though her reflection had little to do with reproduction per se, her 
interview and the subsequent time together since acquainted me with other main themes 
that would soon appear in other interviews with survivors from all different backgrounds. 
Also at this time, I began volunteering at JC&FS (Jewish Child and Family 
Services).  Their Schechter Holocaust Services initiative strives to provide 
companionship to elderly Holocaust survivors in the Boston area, while their Café 
Hakalah program provides monthly social gatherings for the same Holocaust survivor 
community. I assisted two JC&FS supervisors at these gatherings while I waited to be 
matched with survivors. I also used this time to take field notes on the social aspect of the 
survivor community. However, upon submitting a permission letter for recruitment, I was 
denied access to this population and could not continue as a volunteer. They claimed that 
the organization had its own research reviewing process and therefore could not allow 
researchers to use their members as participants. Though my research intentions lacked 
any sense of exploitation or coercion, they maintained a fear that asking elderly survivors 
to talk about the Holocaust could resurface survivor trauma. In the winter of 2015 it felt 
as though my entire research project fell apart.  
I reminded myself of the community-driven aspect of this work and how most 
survivors I met in Israel and America seemed eager to speak with me about their 
experiences. This shift away from JC&FS altered the focus of my research, and forced 
me to discover new and creative ways to recruit the same participants in different 
settings, as well as new themes through which my research could expand. Using my 
status as a Boston Holocaust teacher, synagogue congregant member, and Holocaust 
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scholar, I networked with survivor support groups, memorial and commemorative 
organizations, synagogues, and older adult learning centers, all of which afforded me 
time getting to know their aging and active Holocaust survivors. I continued meticulous 
participant observation as well as extensive networking, and started meeting survivors 
who did not have much to contribute on reproduction but who seemed eager to speak 
with me about other aspects of their Holocaust experience. I recognized that expanding 
my focus to include any survivors who were born into the Holocaust as well as survivors 
and descendants of survivors who could talk about Holocaust trauma might enrich the 
ways I conceptualize the embodied Holocaust story, a theme I noticed emerging in my 
field notes journal. I wrote my final IRB submission to include these participants, and 
The Review Board requested little to no changes. In Spring of 2015 the IRB granted my 
project full approval with “exempt” status, and, without realizing how large and willing 
the survivor community is in Boston, I set out to find between five and ten interviews for 
this investigation. 
 
 
Research Methods and Data Analysis 
My methods for data collection drew upon modified grounded theory and 
phenomenology so that I could examine what survivors who received or witnessed 
reproductive medical assistance in ghettos, hiding, or camps understand about the choices 
they made and of the life and death paradox existing in these circumstances. Using a 
combination of methods that emphasized the value in both modified grounded theory and 
phenomenology solidified an exploration of a conceptualized shared sense of identity 
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developing among survivors and their descendants who recall experiences of pregnancy 
and birth. 
My research activities varied in terms of location, time, and people with whom I 
interacted. Because the same survivors affiliate with many Jewish settings around 
Boston, I did not have merely one physical place from which I could recruit informants. 
Rather, I began with my already-established network of prominent survivors and scholars 
in the Boston area and spoke with them about their understandings of different Holocaust 
experiences and Holocaust narratives. I visited the home of Dr. Lawrence Langer, 
influential literary critic of the Holocaust, to talk about his role in shaping analyses 
regarding Holocaust testimony and his own unique interpretations of “Holocaust trauma.” 
I also maintained a connection to survivors Dr. Anna Ornstein and Dr. Paul Ornstein, 
who have much to say regarding their past experiences and the ways in which they make 
sense of them today. These meetings set the foundation for expanding and discussing my 
research in a wider public setting. 
I subsequently joined a group for child survivors of the Holocaust, The Greater 
Boston Children Survivor’s Organization. I also attended monthly support group 
meetings for older adults who were children and infants during World War II, some of 
whom could speak directly to the topic of reproduction. This group met for three hours, 
the first two dedicated to a declared topic pertaining to Holocaust trauma, and the third 
reserved for coffee and lunch. In this last hour I positioned myself near the door and 
waited as survivors inevitably took turns speaking with me about my research and about 
their experiences. I trained as a docent to the New England Holocaust Memorial (NEHM) 
	   41	  
and led tours to schools from all over the country, who came to see the six pillars 
standing in a one-block radius. Though I could not quite network with these visits for my 
particular research topic I did network with fellow docents, some of whom are survivors 
and others children of survivors. Additionally, I spent time interacting with people at 
BOLLI, Brandeis Osher Lifelong Learning Institute, where I volunteered as a graduate 
student intern in order to meet people there who knew something about these topics. I 
would volunteer in four-hour shifts which included mostly housekeeping tasks, but I 
would position myself in the middle of the main room through which a lot of elderly 
adults passed through. They constantly stopped to talk with me and ask me what I do 
there, and through emailing and publicity of my research I found interested members who 
became participants in my study. All of these venues added new layers of understanding 
to my topic, and transformed my original research question into a multidimensional 
exploration into the embodiment of Holocaust experience. 
 Within these spaces I could employ my interpersonal skills to meet and interact 
with perspective participants. I kept detailed notes on the group sessions I attended as 
well as on the meetings I carried out with individual leaders, volunteers, and members of 
the larger survivor community. I wrote about the Holocaust Remembrance events I 
attended, one in January commemorating the liberation of Auschwitz and the other in 
April for Yom HaShoah, Jewish Holocaust Remembrance Day. I also constantly 
maintained a focus on my research subject in my more “private” work. My positionality 
was shaped by my own psychoanalysis five times a week, where I began to notice a 
visceral connection between my own unpacking of childhood trauma in sessions and the 
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different kinds of trauma unpacked while discussing Holocaust survivor narratives. It 
seemed difficult to separate myself from anthropology, from the Holocaust, and from my 
attempt to better understand the effect and influences of trauma to a survivor’s body and 
mind. Instead I allowed myself to live in this intersection for the two and a half years I 
conducted this research. My field notes journal provided me with a place in which I could 
further intellectualize how narratives of the Holocaust involve larger, more theoretical 
concepts of suffering and memory. 
 I eventually interviewed twelve informants, six of whom identified as “survivors” 
and the rest as “descendants.” I conducted many of my interviews in public settings like 
Starbucks or Panera, though I also conducted several in the homes of my participants. 
These interviews in particular highlighted a ritual around giving a Holocaust survivor 
testimony, as many in-home interviews followed an order first addressing the “serious” 
topics before calming the atmosphere with coffee and cake. I included Dr. Larry Langer 
and Dr. Dawn Skorczewski not as interviewed participants but as knowledgeable 
researchers who assisted me in framing my analyses on the resulting Holocaust survivor 
testimony. I also watched and transcribed fourteen survivor testimonies from The 
University of Southern California’s Shoah Foundation archives (USCSF), all of which 
were given by women who gave birth under extremely unique circumstances in World 
War II (except that of Jack Pinto, who describes his wife’s abortion). Watching these 
testimonies became a ritual in itself, often watching in public places where only 
headphones separated my present day from Auschwitz. 
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From data I built a codebook which demonstrated common themes such as “life 
and death“ and “Holocaust trauma,” as noticed them in the stories of many informants. I 
also had the fortune of gathering memoirs, DVDs, articles, pictures, and journals relating 
to participant experiences, which capture the stories my participants share as they attempt 
to reach a larger, more generalized Holocaust audience. These supplementary materials 
enrich an understanding of Holocaust testimony, and provide different opportunities to 
analyze the storytelling experience as it relates to embodiment, subjectivity, and 
theoretical phenomenology. 
 
Data Analysis Process 
 I first transcribed all digitally recorded interviews with the help of audio playing 
programs such as GarageBand, which afforded me clearer audio and more thorough 
transcriptions. I first documented all field notes by hand, on pads of paper and in my field 
notes journal, before transferring into a Microsoft Word Document. Eventually, I 
transferred all transcriptions and typed copies of field notes to Nvivo, which served as a 
tool to rapidly identify common themes and trends in my notes and interviews. In the first 
round of coding I analyzed transcriptions, field notes, and related memoirs written by my 
participants. Specifically, six coding systems informed my data analysis. 
I first used In Vivo coding, which uses words from participants’ own language as 
codes and themes to carry through the entire dataset (Saldane 2013:264). Second, I used 
Descriptive Coding, which assigns labels to words or brief phrases to summarize the 
main theme (Saldane 2013:262). I also used Initial Coding to break down my data into 
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smaller parts from which deduced similarities and differences (Saldane 2013:265) and 
Structural Coding to apply concepts and phrases to larger segments of data, which relate 
to my specific research question (Saldane 2013:267). Lastly, I employed Emotion Coding 
to label the emotions experienced and expressed by my participants (Saldane 2013:263). 
These coding methods revealed several main themes upon which I intend to 
expand in greater detail in subsequent chapters. A life and death paradox arises as a 
notable concept. This led to additional considerations of how survivors and descendants 
frame the Holocaust as a separate, unreachable dimension from which they themselves 
cannot escape. Moreover, unimaginable confrontations between Jewish Holocaust 
victims and deeply sadistic forms of Nazi torture leave Holocaust survivors, descendants, 
and scholars today struggling to make sense of or find peace with their agency in the 
decisions they made in the past.    
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
“Doing Abortions… Saving Lives” 
Terminated Pregnancies in the Holocaust 
 
 
 
 
Rosa knew Magda was going to die very soon; she should have been dead 
already, but she had been buried away deep inside the magic shawl, 
mistaken there for the shivering mound of Rosa’s breasts; Rosa clung to 
the shawl as if it covered only herself. No one took it away from her. 
Magda was mute. She never cried. Rosa hid her in the barracks, under the 
shawl, but she knew that one day someone would inform; or one day 
someone, not even Stella, would steal Magda to eat her. When Magda 
began to walk Rosa knew that Magda was going to die very soon, 
something would happen. She was afraid to fall asleep; she kept with the 
weight of her thigh on Magda’s body; she was afraid she would smother 
Magda under her thigh. The weight of Rosa was becoming less and less; 
Rosa and Stella were slowly turning into air. 
 
Magda was quiet, but her eyes were horribly alive, like blue tigers. She 
watched. Sometimes she laughed—it seemed a laugh, but how could it be? 
Magda had never seen anyone laugh. Still, Magda laughed at her shawl 
when the wind blew its corner, the bad wind with the pieces of black in it, 
that made Stella’s and Rosa’s eyes tear. Magda’s eyes were always clear 
and tearless. She watched like a tiger. She guarded her shawl. No one 
could touch it; only Rosa could touch it. Stella was not allowed. The shawl 
was Magda’s own baby, her pet, her little sister. She tangled herself up in 
it and sucked on one of the corners when she wanted to be very still. 
  
Then Stella took the shawl away and made Magda die. 
Afterward Stella said: “I was cold.” 
 
-“The Shawl,” Cynthia Ozick 
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Introduction 
 
Often during research collection, new colleagues who heard me discuss my thesis 
would exhale or wince, take a breath, and ask, “have you read The Shawl?” A 1989 New 
York Times article titled “Books of the Times; Cynthia Ozick on the Holocaust, Idolatry 
and Loss” praises author Cynthia Ozick for “set[ting] down, in short, intense takes, an 
account of what happened to Rosa Lublin and her baby daughter, Magda, during their 
internment in a concentration camp during WWII” (NTY 1989). The article continues: 
Both of them, along with Rosa’s niece, Stella, are starving. Rosa worries 
that Stella wants Magda to die so that she can eat her tiny body; she, 
meanwhile, tries to placate her baby’s hunger by giving her a linen shawl 
to chew on…. When Stella steals Magda’s shawl, the distraught infant 
toddles out of the barracks – until then, Rosa has kept her alive by keeping 
her hidden – and she is spotted by a soldier, who brutally murders her by 
throwing her into an electrified fence” (NYT: 2010). 
 
Ozick’s piece gained tremendous popularity after its first publication in The New Yorker 
in 1981 for its contribution to a then emerging body Holocaust fiction. I draw upon it 
here for the ways it reconsiders the concept of survival. While the short story reveals a 
Nazi as the murderer of Jewish babies, we also see from the passage above that, for 
Jewish victims of the Holocaust, survival was not necessarily black-and-white. Nazis 
created such an environment that life for one person often depended on death for another. 
In this sense, Ozick demonstrates what I call “life by death.” Her character, Stella, 
starving and cold, kills baby Magda by stealing her shawl and subjecting her to 
discovery. 
In this chapter I explore the stories of women who became pregnant in the 
Holocaust and had abortions performed by doctors and laypeople in the open or in 
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secrecy. I will also draw upon stories from two gynecologists who performed abortions 
on pregnant Jewish women both in assistance to the Nazis and as secretive acts against 
them. I argue a “life by death” survival; that these stories underscore moments when Jews 
made decisions of survival while living at the extreme intersection of life and death. By 
choosing abortions, they challenge conventional notions of what it means to choose life.  
 In my introduction I referred to Dr. Lawrence Langer’s ”Using and Abusing the 
Holocaust,” in which he expands on the life and death paradox existing by the very nature 
of the Holocaust conditions. I draw upon it here, though, for the ways in which he 
discusses our current language’s inabilities in capturing experiences. He writes, 
The ghastly details of the Holocaust are a constant reminder of the abyss 
separating the lived experience of those who endured it from the language 
that seeks to describe it. To ignore this menacing chasm by bridging it 
with a brittle rhetoric of consolation only increases the risk of plunging 
into the uncertainty churning in its depths. But yielding to its magnetic 
pull creates dilemmas of its own… (Langer 2006: xi). 
 
I talked about this quotation in a meeting with Dr. Langer. He acknowledged a “need for 
survivors to revive a post-war sense of agency in their experience” (SR fieldnotes 
2/11/16), but the truth remains that, in today’s reflections on the Holocaust, we do not 
have the proper language to discuss the concept of agency. While I argue that women 
chose life by means of death, the question of choice in general seems misleading. Women 
reacted to situations about life and death in matters of minutes when they could not 
remain passive. While life often depended on death, these decisions did not depend on 
“choice” but simply the need to reply to their dangerous circumstances. 
 
 
	   48	  
Jewish Law and Abortion 
In order to understand the circumstances in which Jewish women “chose” 
abortion during the Holocaust, it would seem beneficial to explore some of Judaism’s 
stances on abortion. Does Judaism ascribe the same rights to both mother and fetus? 
When and why does Jewish Halakha [sacred, written law] deem the use of abortion 
unethical? When would Halakha permit a woman to abort her fetus? The struggle with 
such questions guided me through an initial ethnographic exploration of how survivors 
and physicians who sought and performed abortions during the Holocaust may have 
engaged with these dilemmas. My first project concerning this data examined not the life-
death paradox I work on here, but instead on the interesting consideration presented by 
orthodox interpretations of “permissible” abortions. I questioned the role of Halakha in 
stories of abortion in the Holocaust. When the topic expanded to include other aspects of 
this research I placed the question of Halakha to the side. Now, I turn back to it as a 
frame for some of the survivor stories you read later in this section. 
Orthodox Rabbi Aharon Meir Goldstein draws attention to the basic foundation of 
one interpretation of abortion: 
While most would agree that the individual liberty does not sanction 
murder, when it comes to abortion the issue turns on the very definition of 
when life begins….Judaism embraces the tremendous sanctity of life. 
Judaism prohibits the wanton destruction of a fetus, and as such, sides 
with the pro-life camp in condemning the use of abortion as mere birth 
control. On the other hand, Judaism also recognizes the necessity for 
abortion in certain cases and therefore does not ban it. Which instances 
specifically warrant abortion is itself a hotly debated topic within Jewish 
law, one in which there is no clear-cut consensus… (Goldstein: 1) 
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Some Jewish customs believe a preservation of life to be of utmost importance. With the 
words “prohibits the wanton destruction of a fetus” and “use of abortion as mere birth 
control,” we can infer that, in one view of Halakhic law, emphasizing the sanctity of life 
leaves little room for terminating a pregnancy without “justifiable” reason. However, the 
words “necessity for abortion in certain cases” also challenge a rejection of abortion in 
non-emergency situations and shed light on the permissibility of abortion under precise 
circumstances in Judaism. In this specific interpretation, the conditions that allow for 
justifiable abortion are ambiguous, and involve both further interpretation of Jewish law 
and an adaptation of that law to specific historical and cultural contexts. 
Daniel B. Sinclair (2003) offers a different lens by highlighting the ways the 
Mishna, an oral interpretation of Torah still used by many different kinds of practicing 
Jews, expands upon the prioritization of the claims to life by both a mother and her fetus, 
respectively: 
Prior to birth, both are living beings, but, as is evident from the end of the 
mishna, the mother is a person whereas the foetus is not, and therefore 
‘her life comes before the life of her foetus.’ Once the major part of the 
foetus has emerged, however, the foetus is also a person, and the general 
rule is that one person may not be killed in order to save the life of 
another” (Sinclair 2003:12). 
 
Sinclair thus seems to address a modern preoccupation with the role of fetus’s 
‘personhood’ and “right” to life. He does not discount that Jewish interpreters view the 
fetus as maintaining some status, but he suggests that, in his interpretation, until the 
fetus’s head emerges from its mother, it does not possess the same status of personhood. 
Many interpreters of Jewish law may agree with Sinclair and further argue that the 
prohibition involved in abortion reflects not the termination of life, but rather the aborting 
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of potential life (Sinclair 2003:12-14). Simply put, this interpretation of Jewish law does 
not afford a fetus full status as a person, equivalent to the pregnant woman’s status, and 
therefore it is not privy to the same rights to life as its potential mother. 
Other Judaic laws do, however, consider a fetus to represent potential life and 
therefore they afford it certain rights and privileges unique to that status (Goldstein: 10). 
David Feldman states that “abortion is not murder, and Maimonides could not have ruled 
otherwise” (Feldman 1986: 86). He presents Maimonides (often referred to as the 
“Rambam”)—a twelfth century Spanish Rabbi and noted commentator on issues of ethics 
and Halakha—as one influential interpreter of Jewish law who understood that, under 
certain conditions, even interpreters of strict Jewish law would permits a Jew to undergo 
an abortion.  
 The Rambam employs the Hebrew word ‘rodef,’ literally translated as ‘pursuer,’ 
to also mean ‘aggressive pursuer of the mother’s life.’ For those who only believe in 
abortion in the strictest of sense, when the mother’s life is at grave risk, they can have 
abortions the same way Halakha would permit a killing of any direct threat to a woman’s 
life. The fetus, in this sense, becomes the rodef. Goldstein adds: 
The law of rodef permits one to kill someone who is threatening to murder 
someone else… by invoking the rationale of rodef to permit killing a fetus, 
Rambam was also teaching us that a fetus is considered a living person. 
Only the status of a rodef permits one person to kill another person. 
Without this justification, the killing of a fetus would in fact be an act of 
murder, the same as killing any other person. Therefore, when not actually 
threatening the mother’s life, killing a fetus is murder (Goldstein: 8). 
  
Goldstein’s argument states “only the status of a rodef permits one person to kill another 
person…without this justification, the killing of a fetus would in fact be an act of 
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murder,” in contrast to many other modern Judaic interpretations. Various movements of 
Judaism, such as Reconstructionist, Reform, and Conservative Judaism permit abortion in 
a broader array of circumstances. 
 In my initial work on Halakha and Holocaust abortions, I considered how even 
the strictest interpreters of Halakha rule on the cases presented in some Holocaust 
testimonies when the rodef, the direct threat to the mother’s life, does not come from the 
fetus directly but actually from the Nazi regime or others in power. Does the simple act 
of being pregnant threaten the mother’s life in these cases, and therefore place the onus 
on the fetus, or does a threat from Nazi policies and destructive practices vis-à-vis 
reproduction complicate the Jewish bioethical approach to abortion? These questions 
concerned me the most. Stories of women who obtained abortions in the Holocaust, who 
state they would not have under “normal circumstances” because of religious reasons, 
challenge the theoretical meanings of permissible abortion. This logic comes dangerously 
close to essentializing Jewish childrearing practices, and I must add that women during 
the Holocaust might have sought abortions for a plethora of reasons having nothing to do 
with their changing circumstances. Moreover, in many places throughout Europe women 
did not identify by their “Jewishness” but instead by their nationality, and did not regard 
their childrearing practices as part of their religious affiliation. Abortions have been 
recommended throughout Jewish history (Navas 2014), when the mother’s life was in 
jeopardy (and otherwise). To assume women only sought abortions because of the 
Holocaust would discredit that fact. However, I argue that the situation became extreme 
in the camps. For people who believed in the strict interpretation of permissible 
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abortion—some of whom I even identify later in this chapter—the Nazi as rodef model 
offered a abortion as a method of survival when they might not have otherwise 
considered it.  
Many survivors and physicians, no matter their religious affiliation, sought to 
balance the Jewish value of preserving potential life against the immediate threat a 
continued pregnancy can pose to an extant Jewish life—that of the pregnant woman—in 
times of duress. These stories share a “life by death” model, where women made 
decisions about survival alongside ones about death. The question of permissible abortion 
adds new layers to those stories where women express the concern for themselves, but 
does not take away from the serious dilemma faced by countless Jews in hundreds of 
Jewish communities. 
 
 
Abortion in Survivor Testimony 
In attempt to rebuild the German Nation, Nazis illegalized abortion for all Aryans 
in the early 1930s. Simultaneously, they coerced many Jews into having abortions or 
utilizing other systems of sterilization as means of limiting their populating (Chelouche 
2007:202). In the early stages of the Holocaust (1933), Nazis targeted Jewish women 
who were found pregnant and labeled them dangerous. As the threat to Jews in Nazi 
Europe increased, many Jews considered abortions as the only option for survival. In this 
section, I share their stories in attempt to argue this decision of preserving life came, 
often, at the price of death. 
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Jack Pinto 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-USC Shoah Foundation 
Jack Pinto, born on August 18, 1907 in Amsterdam, is widely cited by scholars 
working with archived testimonies. I watched his interview first in 2009, and then again 
during my summer research in 2014. He wears a purple shirt and sits in his study, 
surrounded by photos of friends and family. Throughout the interview, Pinto is 
responsive, composed, and animated. His interviewer seemingly pushes him to answer 
questions at times, but Pinto actively responds with as much detail as he can remember. 
The exchange below highlights a segment in which Pinto’s interviewer asked about his 
time working in a Nazi labor unit. Pinto describes a specific visit outside of the camp 
with his wife, and shares how she became pregnant at this time: 
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Pinto: In the meantime, my wife got scarlet fever, when I was working. So I 
was allowed to go home. That was two months in the work camp. And I 
stayed with her. And then she got pregnant again, after we had the two 
children. And she was afraid and I was afraid, and I [told her] ‘you can get 
an abortion.’ And we got it illegal. She went in the hospital, I remember that 
time. 
Interviewer: what was that like? 
Pinto: It was terrible, you know, illegal abortion at that time. If I didn’t have 
it done the child would have been born… he would have been in the gas 
chamber anyway… 
  
Pinto persuaded his wife to undergo an illegal abortion, which she was somehow able to 
obtain in secrecy. He says, “it was terrible…if I didn’t have it done…the child would 
have been in the gas chamber anyway,” as if to say that the child could not avoid death 
either way, but it’s abortion saved Pinto’s life and that of his wife. His interviewer skips 
past this exchange to ask more about Pinto’s chronological description of his time in the 
labor camp. He leaves the abortion story entirely, suggesting the topic is too personal a 
subject to expand on, even in an interview already reflecting much emotional depth and 
raw tone of Pinto’s description. One might consider this silence symbolic of the lack of 
language I talked about above, though his story nonetheless reveals a situation where 
choosing life meant, also, choosing death. 
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Theresia Soetendorp 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-USC Shoah Foundation 
Theresia Soetendorp, born on March 10, 1921, describes an abortion she obtained 
in 1943 after wedding her husband, Bob, in 1942, and going into hiding when Nazi raids 
hit Amsterdam. I watched her testimony while collecting research at Brown. She does not 
smile as much as other survivors, and seems distant. She speaks about her time in hiding, 
when she became pregnant. She says, 
I got pregnant, but that was impossible. My foster mother did not dare and 
consulting a doctor would be too risky…. It had to go like that [with an 
abortion] else I would have given away everything…. It was really awful. 
With my background [in orthodox Judaism] it was terribly difficult, but I 
had no choice. Bob too was broken by it. 
 
For Soetendorp, to continue a pregnancy at this time was “impossible.” She explains that 
it was “awful,” but that she “had no choice” because her child would likely die anyway. 
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In essence, she did have some choice, but she could bare neither result and felt more like 
she must choose between abortion and murder; either way, her own survival depended on 
the death of her child. And she serves as an example of someone who, due to her 
religious upbringing, found it “a terribly difficult” to opt for the abortion. The fact that 
Soetendorp chose to seek an abortion while in hiding signifies the intensity of the 
immediate danger she felt and the fact that she was forced to act against everything she 
believed to save her life. But her story also reflects a decision about life with only choices 
for death, as her abortion saved her unborn child (and, presumably, her) from a horrific 
fate. 
 At that time in Amsterdam, Seoetendorp could not safely obtain an abortion, as 
Nazis manipulated Dutch health care policy in efforts to maintain a superior Aryan race. 
Soetendorp presumably received a clandestine abortion from a doctor who practiced 
medicine against Nazi orders. And only ten days after having the abortion, Nazis 
transported Soetendorp and her husband to Auschwitz, where they sterilized Soetendorp 
as part of their medical experiments. Had she remained pregnant, she would likely have 
been killed in the gas chambers upon arrival. 
Tessa Chelouche and other Holocaust scholars studying women’s Holocaust 
experiences suggest that things only grew worse for pregnant women, who, as the Final 
Solution progressed, were shot on the spot or sent to gas chambers immediately upon 
discovery. And medical doctors who were allowed to practice—i.e. non-Jews—would 
also be shot. To escape such horror and possibly survive, many Jewish women sought 
abortions as safest method. But before Hitler’s rise to power, Jewish families in Europe 
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valued childrearing as one of their highest cultural priorities. Within a short period of 
time, women like Soetendorp who might have eagerly conceived and birthed children 
considered abortion or forced miscarriages their safer options. Families like Soetendorp’s 
were therefore forced to reconsider birth as not a symbol for life but rather a symbol for 
death, with the resulting abortion literally reflecting this inconceivable paradox. 
 
Esia Shor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 
        - USC Shoah Foundation 
The story of Esia Shor, born on December 3, 1925, in Nowogrodek, Poland, stood 
out to me above many others. I watched her alongside the others when collecting initial 
testimony research at Brown University. She speaks softly, sitting in front of hanging 
pictures of friends and family. Her interviewer prompted the following exchange, 
encouraging Shor to reveal a memory of witnessing an abortion in hiding. He asked about 
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life in the partisan camp, which faced incredibly harsh conditions, including extremely 
limited access to medical care: 
Shor: It might strike you funny, but we had a doctor who did a few 
abortions. Because, we couldn’t have any children there. So, this was done. 
In a very primitive way. I even buried a little fetus. 
Interviewer: (quiet, whispered tone): did you? 
Shor: because she came…there was a Jewish girl that came from a Russian 
group…and she was pregnant and, um, you know, oh! …So she came a few 
days later to do the abortion…I don’t remember her name but I remember 
she brought me some wool in thanks for it and that I was so friendly to her 
… she must have been two years older than I am, about eighteen…a 
beautiful woman…so she had this abortion and nobody would touch it…so I 
took it and I looked curiously. It had little hands. Just indescribable, the 
feeling. And I buried it. 
Interviewer: Did they have anesthesia? How was an abortion performed? 
Did you witness it? 
Shor: I wouldn’t be able to explain how. I don’t know. But she survived. It 
can be done without an anesthetic. It’s very painful. But it can be done. 
  
Frankly, Shor’s ability to discuss so candidly this experience of not only witnessing an 
abortion performed in dire conditions, without an anesthetic, but her burial of the aborted 
fetus surprised me. I watched the interview in its entirely and in several parts, she seems 
reserved. She does not necessarily withhold information, but she does present parts of her 
story in quieter tones and without much expression. Here, however, she seemed vigorous, 
animated even. I had the sense that she seemed eager to share the information, as if this 
occurrence fully captured the essence of the deplorable conditions in which she and the 
other partisans lived during the time of the Holocaust. She does not seem remorseful at 
all about her fellow partisan’s abortion, but understands it as the only option for 
preserving life. 
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Two Gynecologists in the Holocaust: “To Save the Lives of Mothers” 
 
Though Nazis threatened death to any doctor offering medical assistance to Jews, 
some physicians did perform abortions during the Holocaust. Dr. Lucie Adelsberger, a 
pediatrician from Berlin and an inmate physician in Auschwitz, justifies the abortions she 
regularly performed for pregnant inmates in the camp: 
She justified this practice [abortion] on the basis of medical ethics, 
claiming that historical ethical principles dictated that when a mother and 
infant are both in danger, then all efforts must be utilized to save the 
mother’s life. “The child has to die so that the life of the mother could be 
saved,” she wrote… (Ben-Sefer 2010:156) 
 
Adelsberger used Jewish tradition to justify her performing abortions. In the words “basis 
of medical ethics” and “historical ethical principles dictated,” we may infer that the use 
of clandestine abortion in Holocaust concentration camps presented life and death 
situations for not only the pregnant women, but also the many doctors who performed 
these abortions.  Two stories from my research of abortionists in the Holocaust raise 
many questions reveal their circumstances. 
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Gisela Perl, “An ambassador of the six million” 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- United States Holocaust Memorial Museum 
 
Showtime’s (2003) TV movie “Out of the Ashes” tells the story of one 
gynecologist from Auschwitz.  Most of the movie portrays Dr. Gisela Perl in present-day 
America reliving her Holocaust experiences through a prosecution for supposedly 
assisting Dr. Mengele in his horrifying treatment of pregnant women. Perl, who learned 
quickly that Nazis would kill pregnant women immediately, performed many abortions 
on pregnant women whom she thought could only survive without their fetuses.  
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A scene shows Emmy award winning actress Christine Lahti sitting in front of a 
team of American prosecutors. As she slowly removes her gloves, meticulously and 
deliberately, they challenge her character on the abortions she performed in Auschwitz: 
Prosecutors: Dr. Perl, moving onto the subject of abortion, which you 
refer to before the break, you say, in your visa application, that you 
personally performed over one thousand abortions? 
Perl: “That is around, yes, but something close to that.” 
Prosecutors: “No matter what the purpose, Dr. Perl, that’s an appalling 
number.” 
Perl: “It had a purpose…. a very deep and important purpose… to save 
the lives of mothers.” 
Prosecutors: “To save the lives of mothers? Women that you, tell us were 
slated to die eventually.” 
Perl: “‘The Nazis intention...was to murder all of us. Every. Last. Jew, 
Starve us, break us. Shoot us, burn us, gas us, anything. As long as the 
result was death.” 
Prosecutors: “Well we understand, Dr. Perl, but there’s certain 
contradictions here…” 
Perl: I understand as a doctor. But my contradiction was, as a human 
being, to survive, I held on. And I forced, ya, I forced others to hold on 
because I never stopped hoping that the, the Russians, or even you. Ha. 
Even you, might find us and stop the killing. So, while you fought your 
war, I fought mine…. [she laughs] Gentlemen, please. It’s really so 
simple. Women who were discovered pregnant were killed. I aborted 
fetuses so that the mother might live. Do you understand? If I could save 
the life of the mother, and she could survive, then she with God’s will 
could bear another child some day. You can’t exterminate the Jewish 
people as long as Jewish women are having babies!  
 
 
Later in the scene, prosecutors challenge Perl for not having instruments to work with 
when performing abortions in the camp. By now, viewers understand the prosecutors not 
to have any sense of Perl’s experiences as a survivor, and find their behavior appalling, 
mirroring a tone of frustrating condescension.  
 Prosecutors: Before you got to the camp and aborted these infants…”  
Perl: “Fetuses!” 
	   62	  
 
Prosecutors: “How could you do it without instruments? Forgive me, Dr. Perl, 
but you don’t seem to have any remorse for your actions.” 
 
Perl: “Forgive me, but you don’t think to listen. Why should I feel remorse for 
saving the lives of one-thousand women? I risked my own life for doing this!”  
 
 
        - Out of the Ashes (2003) 
 
David et al. highlight how “…SS physicians were supposed to perform abortions 
on [racially alien] women found to be pregnant but…since Jewish women discovered to 
be pregnant were immediately dispatched to the gas chambers, Jewish inmate physicians 
performed abortions in secret” (David et al. 1988 :101). Dr. Perl writes about her role in 
conducting clandestine abortions in unimaginable circumstances. In response to the 
accusations that she wrongfully coerced women into having abortions, she states, 
	   63	  
No one will ever know what it meant to me to destroy these babies. After 
years and years of medical practice, childbirth was still to me the most 
beautiful, the greatest miracle of nature. I loved those newborn babies not 
as a doctor but as a mother and it was again and again my own child 
whom I killed to save the life of a woman. Every time when kneeling 
down in the mud, dirt and human excrement which covered the floor of 
the barracks to perform a delivery without instruments, without water, 
without the most elementary requirements of hygiene, I prayed to God to 
help me save the mother or I would never touch a pregnant woman again. 
And if I had not done it, both mother and child would have been cruelly 
murdered. God was good to me. By a miracle, which to every doctor must 
sound like a fairy tale, every one of these women recovered and was able 
to work, which, at least for a while, saved her life (Perl 1993: 114). 
 
While Perl articulates that saving the life of the mother came at an unfortunate cost of 
killing these babies, she acknowledges how difficult she found this action. Despite her 
new “incentive to live,” saving these mothers, she could not process the experience 
without feeling tremendous grief. 
 Roni Peleg highlights similar themes to the movie in her article “Gisela Perl, a 
Jewish Gynecologist in Auschwitz.” She writes, 
...As a Jewish gynecologist in Auschwitz, she worked under the authority 
and command of the ‘Angel of Death’ of Auschwitz, Dr. Mengele. Mengele 
and other staff carried out frequent selections. .... In order to avoid sending 
pregnant women to their death, Dr. Perl had to conduct abortions without 
anesthesia, without medication, without equipment, and in the absurd work 
environment in which she functioned. In women in advanced stages of 
pregnancy, Dr. Perl induced birth by breaking the amniotic sac and manual 
dilation of the cervix, knowing well that the baby would die and the woman 
would be able to return to work as quickly as possible, the only way she 
could stay alive, at least for a while (Peleg 2005: 589) 
 
Here, Peleg underscores the extreme measures to which Perl kept women alive despite 
confronting, quite literally, an angel of death. 
Peleg gives another example of Perl’s work with women and abortion in the story 
of Irma Greze, an SS supervising Perl’s camp. She writes how “[Greze] was responsible 
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for at least 30 murders per day, was participant in Mengele’s selections, and was the most 
feared of all the commanders in the camp. She was infamous for her sexual abuse of 
Polish prisoners. After the war, she was tried by the British and executed by hanging” 
(Peleg 2005: 590). Peleg elaborates on one occasion when Greze, pregnant, ordered Perl 
to perform an abortion: 
Dr. Perl knew that if she did so and it became known, she would be 
executed. On the other hand, she knew that refusing the order also would 
mean execution. Dr. Perl carried out the abortion while Greze kept a gun, 
ready for use, under her head throughout the procedure. Dr. Perl worked like 
a robot, but her thoughts were on the execution that surely awaited her. 
When she completed the abortion, Greze promised her a coat if she 
remained silent about the procedure, but she never got it (Peleg 2005: 590). 
 
Pregnant women were not the only ones whose lives were at risk for performing 
abortions, and this excerpt demonstrates the dangerous position in which Perl found 
herself after assuming the role of abortionist. 
In 1982 Perl gave an interview with The New York Times’s Nadine Brozan, who 
wrote about it in an article titled “Out of Death, A Zest for Life.”  Brozan writes, 
‘The greatest crime in Auschwitz was to be pregnant,’ she said in an 
interview the other day, recalling the edicts of Josef Mengele…. ‘Dr. 
Mengele told me that it was my duty to report every pregnant woman to 
him. He said that they would go to another camp for better nutrition, even 
for milk. So women began to run directly to him, ‘I am pregnant.’ I learned 
that they were all taken to the research block to be used as guinea pigs, and 
then two lives would be thrown into the crematorium. I decided never again 
would there be a pregnant woman in Auschwitz.’ 
 
In this article, Perl calls herself “an ambassador of the six million,” only convinced to 
rejoin the medical community after Eleanor Roosevelt told her at a meeting, “Stop 
torturing yourself, become a doctor again.” Perl responded, “I didn’t want to be a doctor, 
only a witness.” 
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Though her job brought new life into the world, Perl saw pregnancy in the 
Holocaust as birthing into death. Instead, preservation of already-existing life was key. In 
order to survive--to choose life-- Perl, in some ways, chose death. 
 
David Klebanow, “Doing Abortions...saving lives” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- USC Shoah Foundation 
Dr. David Klebanow was Born Nov 1, 1907 in Barysaŭ, Russia, and trained as a 
gynecologist before the war. I came across his USC testimony in an archival index search 
of the word “abortion.” He is eighty-nine years old at the time of the interview, and living 
in Laguna Hills, California. He wears a pale blue button down shirt and speaks, among 
many things, of his time as a gynecologist in the hospital of Riga-Spilwe, a Latvia 
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Concentration Camp in 1944. He explains how Nazis were in the process of building an 
airport, and recruited him to work in the hospital of the facility. 
“Were any of the women [you saw] pregnant?” asked the interviewer, to which 
Klebanow responds,  “Yes, Many. Not many. Few were pregnant. And I right away, I 
was told…” Then he interrupts himself and says, “In the beginning it was no problem.” 
He continues, 
But soon, you know, the S.S. took over [the hospital]… and if, you know, 
SS gets informed that a woman got pregnant [and] gave birth to a child, 
she will be killed and the child will be killed. So I ordered, you 
know...told...you know, ‘please, who ever is pregnant, come, I will 
terminate the pregnancy.’ I am an obstetrician gynecologist! It is my 
field!” 
He brings his hands to his bald head and quickly strokes the back of his neck. He 
continues,  
 
Klebanow: I was doing abortions. I [was] doing abortions [already] for 
my camp, in the… not far away… and there were also men and women, I 
don’t know how many. Five hundred. All the pregnancies. Everybody… 
Klebanow! 
Interviewer: You became the doctor responsible for the abortions. 
Klebanow: “I will tell you the greatest amount,” he says, “It was in ‘44, in July. 
We got two-thousand Hungarian women.” He elaborates, “Among this I had… I 
announced right away whoever is pregnant must come. I had twenty-something 
pregnancies. And I worked with my wife… all night.” When the interviewer adds 
“doing abortions,” Klebanow repeats “doing abortions,” and adds, “saving the 
lives.” 
 
Klebanow had a unique experience in Riga-Spilwe. His story differs from Perl’s, as 
he worked as a gynecologist not in secrecy but for and with some SS Germans. This 
difference, however, does not eliminate death from his story of survival. For example, he 
speaks of one particular moment where he came face-to-face with the camp commandant: 
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Gustav Zorge, with the nickname The Iron Gustav.... He was the greatest 
murderer among the Nazis…. He became the commandant of our camp. 
Now, when I came [to him] the first time with the pregnancy… when I said 
to him, [sir], I examined one of the…. and she’s pregnant. 
 
His voice deepens and elevates, and his face looks surprised. His demeanor changes as he 
mimics Gustav, and reiterates both parts of their interaction: 
‘In my camp a pregnancy!’ You know, he jumped up! And he called right 
away [people] from the army. ‘Come here…’ More people are coming. You 
know, jokingly. But nevertheless he says ‘what do you want to do?’ I said I 
want to terminate. ‘I want to be present.’ Fine. I can’t say no. But, when it 
came to termination of the pregnancy, I called him and he said ‘I cannot 
come.’ I understand he was a womanize… a tremendous womanizer. He 
was very happy he has now a gynecologist, if something happens to this 
women he will have somebody to terminate the pregnancy. 
 
“What did you do with the fetuses you aborted?” the interviewer asks. “It was not a 
fetu… if you have an abortion it is usually in the first three months,” corrects Klebanow. 
“But, for example...let me give you a classic example.” As he tells his story, his voice 
lowers almost to a whisper. He appears saddened, revealing his “example” to be more of 
a “contradiction”: 
Classic example? A German Jewish woman from our camp, from my 
camp, comes to me, and she says ‘I am pregnant.’ I examine her. She is 
six months pregnant. I say, ‘tell me why did you work.’ I knew already 
that she had some relations with the German who managed this group of 
people. Not a Jew. He didn’t work. He only supervised. And, probably 
with him she became pregnant. She somehow… I don’t know why she 
was hiding. At six months she came to me. ‘Uh…. alright. We will have to 
terminate.’ And that was not an abortion. That, I had to induce labor…. I 
dilated the cervix [and] I ruptured the membranes. [In between] I 
stimulated the uterus. And I brought… she had contractions, she had labor, 
and she expelled the fetus. 
 
The interviewer asks about the fetus. Klebanow tries to explain his concern was less for 
the fetus and more for the mother. He knew the fetus had little chance of survival, but the 
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pregnant mother could survive better by terminating the pregnancy. “The fetus was 
small,” interrupts the interviewer, while Klebanow responds “...I don’t care. You don’t 
care what it is. It weighs six grams.” 
At this moment, the dynamic between Klebanow and his interviewer changes 
from question-answer to accusatory. “What do you mean you don’t care?” asks the 
interviewer, as if accusing Klebanow of feeling no remorse for his role in performing 
abortions in the camps. Klebanow becomes aggravated and raises his voice as he repeats 
the words from his interviewer, “what do you care…” He goes on, 
I am in a concentration camp! I know the results! I know the results, that if 
she, if the baby is alive and she is alive, they both will be killed! Please! No, 
it is… you are thinking completely differently. For me I have to get rid of 
him. Put aside. 
 
Just as the prosecutors in Out of Ashes challenged Perl for her role in assisting Mengele, 
Klebanow’s interviewer assumes the role of prosecutor. And in this instant, Klebanow 
responds similarly to Perl’s character by exclaiming that saving a pregnant woman’s life 
meant aborting her fetus. In his words “you are thinking completely differently,” he 
reinforces the argument that we currently have no language to discuss this question of 
“choice” in the life and death paradox.  
After a few questions regarding disposal of fetal tissue, to which Klebanow did not 
have concrete answers, he continues with his “classic example” in efforts to explain the 
danger this woman faced in her pregnancy. After the abortion, the story continues: 
Hold on, I didn’t finish. Uh, she was running a little temperature, and I 
decided to keep her for one to two days. I didn’t know what is the reason 
for the temperature. Maybe she has some tipping the lungs, you know, 
temperature. But, on the second day or on the third day I… some from the 
camps come running to me. ‘Wiesner is here.’ Wisener is… there was the 
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doctor of this [place] named Krepsbach, nicknamed ‘injection’…. Before 
this he was in Mauthausen, terrible reputation. He was injecting phenol 
intravenously under terrible pains, which in ten minutes they were dead…. 
He came already with the reputation. With the SS people he came…. He 
would come, basically, to inspect me twice…. I was informed Wiesner is 
here. Wiesner is the right hand of this Dr. Krepsbach. He is not a doctor…. 
[he] came, I ran out, and I see him going to the second floor, I after him. He 
knew exactly where she is located…. And he comes, and he [says to her] 
‘get up! get up!’ 
 
Klebanow’s voice softens as he continues slowly, 
 
And she understood very well. She got up. She has a small bundle of 
things, she took the bundle with her. And he took her on the truck and 
brought her to Kaiserwald. I [ask] my informers what is going on in 
Kaiserwald. And next day she was taken to place outside the camp, and 
didn’t return. Means? They killed her. 
 
Klebanow’s story affirms how life for a pregnant woman depended mostly on the death 
of her fetus. In his example, survival for this pregnant woman depended on the successful 
loss of her fetus. Because she got sick, she could no longer contribute to the Nazi plan 
and would succumb to death with other sick women. Death was her best chance for life, 
but even that could not save her. “That is an episode to mention,” Klebanow concludes.  
 
 
Conclusion: Death Imagery in Holocaust Rhetoric 
These abortion stories highlight the lose boundaries between death and life in the 
Holocaust settings. We hear very poignant remarks about interacting with death so 
intimately, which begs a consideration of how survivors re-represent the magnitude of the 
death and life paradox when sharing their stories years later. In many interviews with 
descendants of survivors, I noticed that Auschwitz became popular symbol for the 
Holocaust’s death and destruction, even though only one of its three main camps—
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Auschwitz-Birkenau—served as a killing center. As the only camp that tattooed numbers 
directly onto the bodies of its prisoners, Auschwitz remains a symbolic representation of 
“social suffering” literally permanently imprinted upon the memories of its survivors. 
One interview with an Auschwitz survivor further investigates the association between 
that specific camp and extreme Holocaust horror.  
I met Abe through working as a docent at the monument, and he agreed to an 
interview at his home near Boston. He wore a blue pinstriped shirt, a pair of white pants, 
and his hair greased back; he acted professionally and spoke directly to me while 
articulating his story outside on his summer patio. Knowing he speaks in many public 
schools, I quickly discovered the extent to which his story seems so meticulously 
organized. While it did at times in the conversation feel as though Abe “performed” his 
story for me, he did introduce me to many common images of Auschwitz that reveal the 
darkest quality of the camp. For example, he talks about his arrival: 
It was a horrible ride for three days. I don’t know how to express it, 
whether it was happy or it was sad. We came in the morning. Number one 
the smell of burning flesh was unbearable. You saw the fire coming out of 
the high chimneys…. So this is the way we received Auschwitz. But us we 
came out an assembled, and the SS went on the… and they said ‘here 
you’re in Auschwitz now. You didn’t come to a resort area. This is 
concentration camp Auschwitz.’ And our life in Auschwitz concentration 
camp begun. 
 
Abe spent the years between 1942-1944 in Auschwitz at fourteen years old. When he told 
me they deported him to that camp specifically, he paused and lifted his sleeve to reflect 
his tattoo, displaying his arm declaratively, as if to say “look at this!” He did not simply 
survive the Holocaust—he survived Auschwitz. He survived death. 
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Different symbols for death appear throughout Holocaust testimonies. In Chapter 
Five, The Death Camp’s Birth Car, I expand on the story of Ruth Elias, an Auschwitz 
survivor who gave birth under the medical watch of Nazi Dr. Josef Mengele, who appears 
in the stories from later chapters as well. I cite an earlier excerpt of Elias’ interview with 
cinematographer Claude Lanzmann to highlight the ways that she talks about the Doctor 
many nicknamed the Angel of Death. She says, 
He called us, and started to shout: ‘How is it possible that I didn’t see two 
pregnant women? Where were you when I… when I was picking out 
people for [selection]?’ He just couldn’t grasp it that he didn’t see us, and 
he said ‘give birth, and then you will see.’ He came each day, a very 
charming man…. And of course we heard Mengele and we were afraid, 
very afraid of him. My tongue was somehow stiff, and I only answered his 
questions. He came every day to visit us… [He] was very attractive, very 
attractive. Very charming. Very good manners…. He was middle-sized, 
not tall and not small. He made a very good impression in his uniforms, 
and he was very self-conscious, and very secure... 
 
In many of those Holocaust narratives that reflect on the presence death in concentration 
camps, like Elias’, survivors associate Mengele with the divine task of choosing who 
lives and who dies. They present him as seductive and charming, yet he simultaneously 
haunts many accounts of the most heinous crimes committed against a person’s body 
(demonstrated in the pictures below, where Mengele displayed his attempts to join twins 
together at their genitals).  
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Mengele did not simply limit his victims to pregnant women, but he did take 
particular interest in experimenting on women during open surgical procedures like 
abortions and birth. He also used infants as test subjects, demonstrated in the pictures 
above.  He acted as an angel who delivers death, eventually, as a very welcomed 
reprieve. Even if the life-death paradox did not exist at the core of Holocaust narratives, 
Mengele’s symbolic representation as the angel of death in these stories of pregnancy 
exemplifies how the boundaries separating life and death became blurred, and both Nazis 
and their Jewish victims might move between the categories. 
Myrna Goldenberg proposes that “by drawing attention to ‘happy endings’—the 
few babies saved, the few pregnant women protected—such stories create a feeling of 
optimism in face of a destruction that we know, historically, was almost completely 
achieved” (Goldenberg 1998: 371). In the pages that follow I have no intention to 
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conceptualize the stories as ‘happy endings,’ and instead suggest that they show how 
pregnancy symbolized a continuation of life while simultaneously threatening the lives of 
others with murder. This paradox underscores an extraordinary dilemma of birthing into 
death.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
The Death Camp’s Birth Car: 
Childrearing in the Holocaust 
 
 
 
 
 
Moreover, this complementary vision may enable us to comprehend how 
little discredit falls to these victims, who were plunged into a crises of 
what we might call ‘choiceless choice,’ where critical decisions did not 
reflect options between life and death, but between one form of ‘abnormal’ 
response and another, both imposed by a situation that was in no way of 
the victim’s own choosing… 
—Lawrence Langer 
 
 
 
Introduction 
In December 2015 I attended the American Jewish Society’s (AJS) annual 
meetings in downtown Boston and heard a panel called “Silences in the Archives,” 
organized by five scholars of Holocaust research who offer new ways of thinking about 
testimonies. A topic of main interest to many researchers lately involves recently released 
footage collected by Claude Lanzmann during the making of 1980s landmark 
documentary Shoah. Decades after the release of the nine-hour film, comprised of 
interviews with survivors, bystanders, and perpetrators, the United States Holocaust 
Memorial Museum published on their website some new footage of interviews (with 
original transcripts) that did not make the final film. One paper in this AJS panel 
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considered why Lanzmann originally publish the interviews of mostly men instead of 
including women like Ruth Elias. “It’s such a shame,” she argued, “because Elias has 
quite a story to tell.” 
This chapter’s epigraph comes from Dr. Lawrence Langer’s “The Dilemma of 
Choice in the Death Camps,” in which he discusses his notion of “choiceless choice” in 
Holocaust testimonies. In the words “critical decisions [reflected] options… between one 
form of ‘abnormal’ response and another, both imposed by a situation that was in no way 
of the victim’s own choosing…” we understand “choiceless choice” to refer to situations 
where people, with no control over their circumstances, had to make decisions between 
“choices” that were not choices at all. Whereas in my first chapter, “Doing Abortions, 
Saving Lives” I argue women did not choose their outcomes and simply reacted to their 
situations, I argue in this chapter that situations of birth reflect Dr. Langer’s concept of 
choiceless choice. Stories of women who became pregnant and gave birth during the 
Holocaust offer an alternative way to consider the concept of choice. They had to make 
decisions about birth, but Nazis offered no solution in the form of something they might 
choose under “normal” circumstances. Although Langer claims these “critical decisions 
did not reflect options between life and death,” the choiceless choice birth moments I 
include in this chapter nevertheless do underscore the paradox of life and death in the 
Holocaust. 
We see this theme emerge in later parts of Elias’ story. I learned shortly after that 
Ruth Elias was sent to Theresienstadt from Czechoslovakia, where she became pregnant. 
After hiding her “condition” in Auschwitz, Elias gave birth to a baby girl and shares the 
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entire experience in an ongoing interview with Lanzmann, which took place between 
1978-1981.4 She speaks of Dr. Mengele’s inclusion of Elias and her infant son in his 
medical experiments. In Chapter One, “Doing Abortions, Saving Lives” I use Elias to 
discuss how, for survivors who met Mengele, he came to symbolize the life and death 
paradox underscoring most Holocaust rhetoric. But I draw upon a longer segment here in 
which Elias talks about both her birth experience and Mengele’s response: 
One day in the afternoon I started with my pains. I didn’t know they were 
pains, I thought I had eaten something, because I had nobody to explain to 
me. The pains in the afternoon became stronger and stronger and stronger. 
In this [place] was a Polish midwife, and she say me; she took a cover and 
put it… in the blocks there was an oven running from one side to the 
other, and in the middle was a sort of bench you could sit on, a very long 
bench through the whole block. She put a cover on it, told me to lie down, 
and she started to pray the rosenkrantz near me. The pains went stronger 
and stronger, and I gave birth that night to a beautiful girl. Very big. She 
helped me. There was no cotton wool, there was no boiling water, nothing. 
I lay in my own dirt. The baby was born, and from somewhere she took 
some linen… In the morning Mengele came and told this woman, ‘You 
have to put a bandage over her breasts – she must not feed the baby I want 
to see how long a baby can live without food.’ My breasts were bound, 
and the baby was near me, crying. She was hungry. 
 
…The next day, when Mengele came he told us ‘Tomorrow morning at 8 
o’clock you will be ready with your child. I am coming to fetch you.’ I 
know where he was going to fetch me – he was taking us to the gas 
chambers, and I didn’t want to live anymore. It was terrible…. The lights 
went off and I started to scream, because everything was so terrible. A 
doctor, a woman doctor, came to me: ‘why are you screaming?’ I told her 
‘I am going to die tomorrow.’ She said ‘Oh, it’s you who returned from 
Hamburg?’ I said ‘Yes, I am going tomorrow. Mengele is coming to fetch 
me.’ She said ‘I must do something for you’ She came back half an hour 
later with an injection needle. She told me ‘Give this to your child.’ …. I 
told her, ‘How can I give this [morphine] to my child? How can I be the 
murderer of my child?’ 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 http://www.ushmm.org/online/film/display/detail.php?file_num=4736  
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Elias raises a very important question asked by many mothers during the Holocaust. 
“How can I be the murderer of my child?” Choosing life at the expense of her child’s 
death did not seem like a choice at all. In the end, she confesses, “I gave the injection to 
my child…and the child started to die, near me. It took one hour, perhaps two. I don’t 
know.” 
She adds, 
 
At 8 ‘clock Mengele came and I was ready to be transported. He asked 
me, ‘Where is the child?’ I told him ‘It died last night.’ ‘I want to see the 
corpse.’ Off he went. I was told that he was looking for the corpse, but in 
this heap of corpses, to find such a tiny corpse – he couldn’t. Even for Dr. 
Mengele it was difficult. He came back to me and told me… ‘You had 
luck! With the next transport you are going to live.’ I was glad. I had no 
joy. I was broken. 
 
Elias’ words highlight the very real connection between the life-death paradox in birth 
stories from the Holocaust and Langer’s concept of “choiceless choice.” Her survival 
depended on the death of her child, but she could not bear to make this decision. Mengele 
refers to the baby’s death as the “luck” that kept Elias living, but how does one even 
begin to make sense of such circumstances? In the pages to follow, I draw upon 
additional testimony in efforts to portray such attempts in testimony. 
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-Ruth Elias, USHMM 
 
 
 
 
 “Choiceless Choice” and a Lack of Agency 
I continue to explore the question of agency through a closer look at “choice,” or lack 
thereof, during the Holocaust. In survivor Olga Lengyel’s memoir, published in 1947—
just two years after the Holocaust, and, consequently, at a time before many survivors 
wrote about their experiences—she reflects on experiences of stories of pregnancy in the 
Holocaust: 
…I more than once saw the doctors defy every danger and certify that a 
woman was not pregnant when they positively knew she was. Dr G. stood 
up to the infamous Dr. Mengele, medical director of the camp, and denied 
every case of pregnancy that could possibly be contested. Later, the camp 
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infirmary somehow secured a drug which, through injection, brought 
about premature births. What could we do? Wherever possible, the doctors 
resorted to this procedure, which was certainly the lesser horror for the 
mother (Lengyel 1947: 115-116).  
 
Lengyel’s account suggests that for the mother, “premature births” seemed the “lesser 
horror” and therefore she often opted for this procedure instead of carrying the baby to 
full term. Like Elias, neither of her options seemed like actual options. In fact, many 
women who arrived at the camps pregnant presumably wanted to carry their babies to 
term and deliver under safe conditions, but most of them hardly had circumstances that 
permitted a healthy birth nor life-sustaining situations for the babies. Premature births, 
and other extreme measures, sometimes appeared the best of all options. In these 
situations, the concept of choice does not at all seem clear. While women opted for the 
best outcome, one can make the claim they would not have chosen from any of their 
options had they remained free. In essence, giving birth under the harshest of conditions, 
which did not create for themselves, often felt like a “choiceless choice.”  
Lawrence Langer writes about this altered notion of agency in the Holocaust and 
reiterates how any analysis of Holocaust testimonies ought to disengage from current 
notions of ethical behavior. His term “choiceless choice” articulates the experience in 
which “the victims are offered an option that is no option, since the results of a lottery are 
governed by chance, not choice… [and] anyone who refused to participate in the macabre 
game certified his execution the next day” (Langer 1980: 230). Among the many 
examples he provides in this article, he highlights one about mother and children: 
How are we to portray or apply ethical measures to that prototypical 
example of choiceless choice, the mother of three children who reputedly 
was told by the Nazis that she might save one of them from execution? 
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She was free to “choose,” but what civilized mind could consider this an 
exercise of moral choice, or discover in modern history or Jewish tradition 
a myth to dignify her dilemma (Langer 1980: 228)?  
 
Langer’s example underlines an important piece to his notion of “choiceless choice,” 
namely that the “alternatives are not difficult, they are impossible” (Langer 1980: 229). If 
the mother chooses one child her other two must die, and Langer suggests, “We are left 
with the revelation of a terrifying question posed by a universe that lacks a vision to 
contain it… How is character to survive any decision in such a situation, and retain a 
semblance of human dignity” (Langer 1980: 229)?  
In order to understand Langer’s theory, we must consider the Holocaust as a 
world entirely unlike one we live in today, as Nazis suspended all preconceived notions 
of a moral society. Survivor Primo Levi writes about the suspension of ethics during the 
Holocaust, and suggests that the atmosphere of concentration and death camps produced 
new codes of behavior. He writes, “…It is a gray zone, poorly defined, where the two 
camps of masters and servants both diverge and converge. This gray zone possesses an 
incredibly complicated internal structure and contains within itself enough to confuse our 
need to judge” (Levi: 1980: 40). Here, Levi highlights a difference between how 
survivors conceptualize their actions during the Holocaust, and how listeners to and 
viewers of Holocaust testimony might later criticize those same actions. He proposes, 
instead, that the moral standards in which people engage today cannot apply to the 
environment of the Holocaust; not only did man’s behavior change on the verge of death, 
but the code of behavior to which they subscribed also transformed.   
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Levi does not stand alone in his argument that the “gray zone” context of the 
concentration camp confuses our need to judge decisions victims made. Philippe 
Bourgois and Jeffrey Schonberg borrow the term in their ethnography, “Righteous 
Dopefiend,” in which they regard “the way structurally imposed everyday suffering 
generates violent and destructive subjectivities” (Bourgois and Schonberg 2009: 19). 
They write further: 
The autobiographical literature created by Holocaust survivors provides 
exceptional insight into how state coercion can make monsters of the 
meek…. In [Levi’s] Gray Zone, survival imperatives overcome human 
decency as inmates jockey desperately for a shred of advantage within 
camp hierarchies, striving to live just a little bit longer…. Levi and other 
survivors assert that we do not have the right to judge the actions of 
inmates in the concentration camps because the Gray Zone was 
omnipotent…. (Bourgois and Schonberg 2009: 19-20). 
 
Bourgois and Schonberg highlight Levi’s main theme, namely that we recognize in the 
Holocaust context the “structural injustices that pass for business as usual in normal 
times” (Bourgois and Schonberg 2009: 21), in order to make the concept of Gray Zones 
relatable to the homelessness they explore. They mention Levi in order to question 
whether we, today, can judge the actions of people in extreme circumstances, when they 
did what they can to remain alive. 
Other scholars refer to the state of existing within this Gray Zone without actually 
using the term “Gray Zone,” mostly to discuss the influence of Foucault’s biopower in 
the creation of different subjectivities. Giorgio Agamben (1998), for example, coins the 
term “bare life” as “the biological life stripped of agency or political voice” (Willen 
2010: 507), or the “human life included in the juridical order only by means of an 
exclusion depriving it of the protections the law affords” (Peck 2015: 74). Sarah Willen 
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cites Agamben in her article, “Darfur Through a Shoah Lens” alongside Pandolfi, who 
suggests “when subjectivity and political identity are sheared away, human 
distinctiveness and dignity are deactivated and suppressed; they are ‘erased by the new 
categories in which human beings are pigeonholed’” (Willen 2010: 507) 
 By bringing together these two ideas, Willen underscores the state of existing 
without agency, and the complex issues that arise as a result of such a position. But I 
draw upon it here following the concept of Gray Zone to emphasize the reality of 
people’s agency—or lack thereof—over their own pregnancies in the Holocaust. It makes 
sense that “the biological life stripped of agency or political voice” would face the 
extreme dilemmas of “choiceless choice.” 
Lawrence Langer received much praise for his “Choiceless choice” theme, and 
scholars have employed it in their own work since he published it. “Choiceless choice” 
highlights the circumstances of all people in the camps, people who had no choice about 
how to die. For some women, having abortions was a means of survival, and for others 
giving birth fulfilled the same purpose. But in neither situation women and doctors could 
not predict exactly what would happen, and many women lost their lives because of the 
clandestine and highly dangerous abortions and births. Making statements like “the 
abortion saved my life” or “I wanted to die with my baby” might represent the survivor’s 
need to establish some—if any—sense of control. 
While some regard “choiceless choice” for the ways it focuses on the individual 
Holocaust experience, one can also critique it for implying women still made a decision. 
They simply reacted to their environments and the daily changing circumstances, which 
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often encompassed serious threats of death. The theoretical framework of “choiceless 
choice” demonstrate decisions of reaction, where Nazis held their prisoners under 
constraints of unbearably constricted “choices;” they had to act without knowing what the 
next step would be or when death would come for them once and for all. 
 	  
Birth in the Holocaust: Selected Testimonies 
 This section will take Langer’s concept of “choiceless choice” and the question of 
agency during the Holocaust to explore deeper some testimonies of women who became 
pregnant and gave birth in the Holocaust.  
 
Cato de Vries 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-USC Shoah Foundation 
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Cato de Vries, born March 15, 1915 in Dordrecht, Netherlands, discusses her time 
hiding in Utrecht and several ‘smaller’ places close by. In Hellendoorn, de Vries 
discovered she became pregnant: 
I was pregnant. And, being a nurse, I knew exactly that I was pregnant in 
the beginning of course. And the girl [who looked after us], Enkie, I 
looked at her and said ‘Look I can’t have a baby! It’s too dangerous.’ And 
she agreed with me it was too dangerous, there. Because we were not very 
clean in the place as well. And I said I can’t have a baby it’s too 
dangerous. 
Over and over again, de Vries emphasizes the “danger.” After learning about her 
pregnancy she first considers abortion as a means of self-protection. She knew about the 
threats that existed for people in hiding—especially pregnant Jewish women—and did 
not want to risk any harm ensuing on herself and on the people helping them hide. In fact, 
she left the place in which she hid in order to find better accommodations for her 
‘condition.’ Her decision to carry the pregnancy changed with a different group of 
caretakers: 
There were these very religious catholic people. And they took me 
because I was pregnant. They were very, very… they did help a lot, very 
good people too…. She said ‘you don’t get an abortion. You get your 
baby.’ 
 
De Vries changed her opinion because her new circumstances allowed her the option of 
delivering her child in a slightly safer environment. In this instance, De Vries carried her 
pregnancy to term by chance. But she illustrates that it could have been different had she 
remained where she was. For her, as for many women with limited agency, the ultimate 
decision about childbearing very often lay beyond her absolute choice. 
 Despite a mild sense of protection, details of de Vries’ birth story demonstrate 
that, even in a more secure setting, the possibility of death still existed at any moment: 
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In December ’44 they… I don’t know if you heard about the special 
bombs. I can’t remember the name, there’s a special name. They were sent 
from England to Germany. And one bursted very close to where we were. 
So we had to leave the house and we had to hide ourselves behind the 
bush…but no body knew we were Jews of course. There were more 
people hiding. So we were all in the bush until it was quiet again. And that 
day I started getting the baby…. When it started, when the birth started, 
there was only a midwife, saw me once but never examined me or 
anything. She said to the woman in the place where we were hiding ‘I 
think they are Jews.’ …Anyway she did come, but it was too late. My 
husband had to help, I was already busy with the birth…anyway she never 
said anything, and he helped with the birth of our son. 
 
While birthing her child outside in the bushes of Hellendoorn, de Vries feared both bomb 
explosions and the exposure of her Jewishness. A midwife treated her as subhuman. All 
the while she knew her circumstances forced her to think about the well being of her 
entire family. So she birthed, literally, into a scene of death. She had to act, but with 
hardly any control over what happens next. 
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Anna Bergman 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-USC Shoah Foundation 
 
 Anna Bergman, born April 20th 1917 in Czechoslovakia, shares a slightly 
different story of “choiceless choice” in her USC testimony. She spent the war not in 
hiding but first in Theresienstadt and then in Mauthausen: 
Interviewer: You... and you, you said just before… before we… before 
the cameras started about how this was one of the few pleasures left. 
Bergman: Well yes it was one of the few things which were… sort of… 
which… which kept us alive or something. Because there was so little of 
other things, and everything was constricted. Of course it was strictly 
forbidden by the Germans. If that had come out that would have been… 
dreadful.  
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The interviewer brings into focus a moment shared “behind the scenes,” in which 
Bergman presumably told her that sexual activity remained one of their only pleasures in 
the camps. By adding, “…it was one of the few things…which kept us alive,” she appears 
neither apologetic nor ashamed, and instead reveals how there were ways in which 
concentration camp inmates fought off death with their physical bodies. She speaks in a 
defensive manner, reinforcing the notion of a Holocaust’s different moral code. But the 
same efforts that kept her alive also brought her closer to death. 
If the Nazis classified their unwanted Jewish fetuses as belongings of the state 
because they were conceived in the concentration camp, then Bergman almost seems to 
need to defend them as real:  “It’s true!” Her story, like the others mentioned above, 
jumps between life and death, portraying the Holocaust as a world where the same sexual 
behaviors that fueled one’s survival and made her feel alive also placed her life and the 
life of the resulting children in great risk. “That’s it. That’s what I wanted to point out,” 
she says, inadvertently stopping her interviewer from asking further questions. 
Unlike other USC Foundation testimonies, Bergman’s consists mainly of details 
of her birth story. She lived in the part of Europe invaded at the later end of the war, 
because of this, she interacted with Nazis while openly pregnant more than other women 
admit. Unlike many of the USC testimonies I watched where women discuss pregnancy 
by inserting the experience in the string of other Holocaust experiences, Bergman’s deals 
most with those moments related to birth. We learn later on that she became pregnant 
twice during the Holocaust, losing her first son at two months to pneumonia, and 
successfully delivering her second child upon arrival at Mauthausen concentration camp. 
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She does not elaborate much on her the first pregnancy, except for sharing a moment 
where life and death did not separate from one another. Nazis forced her and the other 
pregnant women from Terezin to sign a form giving the Third Reich legal authority to 
kill their children immediately upon delivery: 
Bergman: so it was a crime ... and we had to sign this paper. But this is a 
very odd thing, that in none of the books this event is described. But we 
were only five. And I don’t suppose it happened to any body before or 
after. It may have been a special case. Or that one of the Germans put it in 
his head that it had to be done this way. I don’t know. 
 
[…] 
 
Interviewer: Who was it that made you sign the form? 
Bergman: Well some of the Germans. I can’t remember… one of the SS 
men. I can’t remember who it was [shakes head]. But… and we signed 
sort of… [then her voice lowers in despair] we signed it. How could you 
sign a thing like that? But we did.  
Interviewer: Did they threaten you? 
Bergman: No. You sign it and you signed. And that was it. No body 
press… I mean, the presence of the SS man was enough . And… 
[resolved, relieved a bit] well we signed it. …I have never found… ever… 
anything about it written in any of the books…  
Interviewer: And that’s why… because… that’s why I am asking you a 
few more questions, because it’s a [unique…experience. 
Bergman: [Well] I should say it’s unique but hardly anybody knows 
about it. …. And I honestly hadn’t dreamt it [laughs] it’s true!  
 
Bergman alternately defends and challenges the fact that she signed away her child’s life, 
a clear moment of “choiceless choice.” On the one hand, she insists that “the presence of 
the SS man (i.e. ‘death’) was enough,” while on the other hand she pushes the listener’s 
attention to the absence of this detail from the historical record. Vacillating back and 
forth from the absence of the real in the record and the fact that the entire act might sound 
as if she had “dreamt it,” she asks her own question arising from the intensity of these 
moments: “Who ever heard of such a thing?” 
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 Later, she describes the second time she gave birth, during her arrival to 
Mauthausen death camp. She says, 
Alright. So we arrive in the… on top of the hill in the concentration camp 
and there they moved us from one cart to another cart because… the … 
concentration camp hospital was called Revere. Every concentration 
camp hospital was called Revere, I don’t know why.  And that was again 
down the hill [motions with finger]. So I was in the middle of having the 
baby and they moved me from this one cart to another cart and I was 
going down the hill with other women who were lying there dying of 
Typhoid fever and Typhus and the lice crawling around [motions] 
and….And suddenly the baby came, without moving, without shouting, 
without screaming, without anything. And I really couldn’t care less what 
happened or didn’t happen. It was out. And we were still going down the 
hill. And… I probably screamed with the last pain or whatever and the SS 
man who was taking us down said ‘[nods] you can scream as much as 
you want to.’ He was very benevolent and lovely.  
 
And at this, Bergman continues on to explain the post-birth, post-liberation scene. The 
story shifts away from the horrors of her pregnancy and portrays their joint survival as 
victorious. 
 I want to turn back to the pieces of Bergman’s birth story that enhance the life and 
death paradox. When Bergman talks about her son’s death, for example, near the 
beginning of her overall pregnancy narrative, she speaks with somewhat of an emotional 
dissociation: “I thought it was dreadful really. But I mean so many dreadful things 
happened…. And after all he was only two months old. One gets over that really.” She 
claims “one gets over that” as if all mothers do, but we can speculate that Bergman 
speaks so easily about the death of her first child because Nazis claimed him dead before 
Bergman even gave birth. Her second child, Eva, born at the very end of the war, 
survived; while Bergman birthed her in a death camp, Eva had more chance for life than 
the boy, and it would make sense that Bergman feels more at ease talking about her 
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survival than her child destined for death. But, she does credit him for saving her life and 
Eva’s life, claiming that she might have died as well if her son remained alive. While she 
detaches from his memory, she simultaneously treasures it, thanking it for her survival. 
This initial detachment allowed for her to remember the event after the initial trauma 
itself passed. 
 Throughout the interview, Bergman repeats varieties on the phrase “it all sounds 
completely mad but that’s what happened.” She even engages more with her interviewer, 
asking for responses to what she must consider ludicrous circumstances. In one exchange 
at the end, Bergman talks about her breastfeeding success and says “... there was so much 
milk that I could have fed five babies, not one. Can you explain it,” then she pauses, and 
continues, “no? Neither can I.” These moments between Bergman and her interviewer, 
suggests that Bergman found these circumstances to sound unrealistic—too outrageous to 
have happened, or to believe. She says, “I’m not making it up, I swear it’s true!” as if to 
ground herself in the reality of her situation. 
I realized that for Bergman, the recognition of the experience itself validates her 
survival. Many survivors like Bergman appear defensive when they feel their story is not 
believable, as my own key informant reminded me that even she “needs recognition of 
her story and of her survival.” The paradox between life and death in her testimony and 
the “choiceless choice” dilemmas she faced forces her to fight against reality and the 
questions from her interviewer about  what happened and what did not happen. She must 
gain the response of her interviewer to validate her own rendition and ultimately choose 
to remain in the land of the living. 
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Edith Polgar  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Edith Polgar was born December 18 1922 in Baden, Austria, and survived a 
pregnancy in Auschwitz. Her story questions the role of memory in the retelling of a 
traumatic experience, as certain anecdotes do not always seem plausible. Polgar became 
pregnant while living in a ghetto with her Aunt and sixteen other people. In her USC 
testimony she talks briefly about how Nazis deported her husband to Mauthausen death 
camp before he knew about the pregnancy, but her story includes details mostly of what 
incurred after. I begin with her recalling the moment she found out about her pregnancy: 
Interviewer: What were your feelings at the time? You knew you were 
going to have a baby. 
Polgar: Be honest with you, I was young and when you’re young you 
don’t think. [Smirks, pauses] That is… because if I would have thought of 
it, what would become and how things are, I think I never would have 
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been…fallen pregnant, or… it was just a coincidence. But, as it happened 
it happened. Was really upset. My mother was really upset, my father was 
really upset too. But we couldn’t do anything. Because I was already… in 
that time you couldn’t take it away either. So I just had to go and 
do…whatever become. 
 
Her final words “So I just had to go and do…whatever become” demonstrate that Polgar, 
like many pregnant women during the Holocaust, had no control over her circumstances. 
She knew she had to act in ways for which she could not prepare or would not have 
chosen. Differently from Bergman, who became ecstatic at the knowledge of her 
pregnancies, Polgar somewhat victimizes herself by confessing “if I would have thought 
of it, what would become and how things are, I think I never would have [gotten 
pregnant].” In her whispered, slow mannered demeanor, in which she does not call the 
baby by her name, we can infer that her birth story involves much death. We see this 
even in the way she claims to have “fallen pregnant,” as if she caught a disease. With a 
still face, cold and reserved body language, and a mostly flat tone, her testimony stands 
out as one of a suffering survivor. But her testimony also fails to follow a coherent 
timeline and logical story, and therefore highlights an interesting relationship between 
memory and embodied trauma. 
 After providing details of her first few months in Auschwitz—of her arrival in the 
winter, with the lack of food—she reaches a particular moment where she traded 
positions with her sister during a Mengele selection:  
…Mengele was coming, all the women who was there, we had to stand 1-
2-3-4 in a row. There was thousands of us. He came to inspect… uh… 
actually we were waiting one or two hours in that cold until he came for 
an inspection. Who he can take to the gas chamber and who he can take 
to be working…. And I was then already four and a half months 
pregnant, or three and a half, I can’t remember. And as how we were 
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standing… my middle sister, she was the first one, I was the second one, 
my younger sister the third one and one of her girlfriends. And… when 
my middle sister, Mengele… turned her around, your health and 
everything, he told her to go on the other side. When she went on the 
other side, and Mengele meant away from us… because first row and 
then he went further… I told my sister, ‘would you come back and I’ll go 
there?’ And that’s how I saved my life. He couldn’t see me, that I was 
pregnant. [Pause] So… my other sisters came the same place like me, 
they were all healthy to go to work. We went back to our barracks. The 
next morning we were shifted on the train… to work. 
 
This moment in her story stood out to me as bizarre. How could she, noticeably pregnant, 
switch positions with her sister during a Mengele selection without anyone noticing her? 
Would not the Nazis kill her, or in the very least “punish” her, for moving out of line? 
The next piece of the story followed a similar pattern: 
… We went… I went on the train, and the train wasn’t moving. And one 
of the Polish girl who were there for a long time already, and she noticed I 
was pregnant, she wanted to pull me out of the train. And then I told her ‘I 
have something in my mouth.’ If she doesn’t tell anybody or doesn’t pull 
me off I give it to her. But only when the train was moving… and I 
went… and I was very naïve because she could have stopped the train or 
anything to do. So, I had a diamond in my mouth. And I gave it to her. I 
had it in the back of my mouth. And I gave it to her. And that is how I 
saved the second time, from Auschwitz.   
 
As the first and only time Polgar mentioned the diamond, this moment highlights a 
pattern in the recollection of traumatic experiences. She describes two moments where 
she nearly escapes death to survive Auschwitz as a pregnant Jewish woman. She recalls 
them so clearly, and yet the scenarios each seem relatively implausible. 
 Lawrence Langer writes in his preface to Holocaust Testimonies: The Ruins of 
Memory: 
…Nothing is clearer in these narratives than that Holocaust memory is an 
insomniac faculty, whose mental eyes have never slept… since 
testimonies are human documents rather than merely historical ones, the 
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troubled interaction between past and present achieves a gravity that 
suppresses the concern with the accuracy (Langer 1991:xv).  
 
I read this to him in one of our meetings together, to which he responded “did I write 
that?” But he again agreed with himself, reiterating to me the words he wrote in this 
acclaimed piece. He also then reminded me how factual errors do occur from time to 
time. He writes how “they seem trivial in comparison to the complex layers of memory 
that give birth to the versions of self” (Langer 1991:xv). The reiteration of Polgar giving 
birth in the Holocaust—the ways in which she remembers and interprets the 
experiences—“give birth” to the versions of Edith Polgar we meet in her testimony. But I 
question memory’s role in the shaping of the uniquely traumatizing experience of 
birthing new life into a context of death.  
 This question stayed with me as I moved through her story. After leaving 
Auschwitz, Polgar continued working; eventually she gave birth, only mentioning very 
briefly that her child was born. Then she continues, 
Polgar: And, uh, [pause] when I… was with my pregnancy nearly on the 
end I still went to work. Only the last three weeks of my pregnancy 
already when I was 9 months old they kept me in that home, but I didn’t… 
I had to do cleaning, I had to go to the kitchen. So, different things. When 
my child was born… it was a very quick birth… she was beautiful, but 
after that I became very ill. I couldn’t walk. … so that nurse, she gave me 
for my, when I couldn’t walk, she took the blood from my arms and put it 
in my legs. And they warmed up water and everything, that I should go 
outside. Well, about two months until I could walk. 
Interviewer: So after you had your baby? 
Polgar: After I had my baby. 
Interviewer: You weren’t able to walk? 
Polgar: [shakes head] so after two months I could walk again. 
Interviewer: So how did you look after your baby? 
Polgar: My sisters. And all—everybody there. Everybody. We were 
enough for them. Everybody. And, uh, when I could walk I didn’t have to 
go back to the factory to work there.  
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The interviewer chose not to pursue this thread of Polgar’s injury, but this exchange 
suggests continuity of a struggle since the beginning of the pregnancy. After her birth, the 
struggle became not only emotional but seriously physical as well. Presumably already 
malnourished, this incapacity placed Polgar’s life and the life of her child in grave 
danger. Her sisters and family provided the support she needed to care for her child, but 
then she got transferred to a different camp: 
The baby was about four months old… five months old… when they… 
came. My sister, she worked in the office. The other sister worked in the 
factory, and she knew all about what’s going on, what’s coming. Because 
she heard everything. She worked in the office, by the Germans. And one 
day she came home and her eyes were cried out and my other sister’s eyes 
were cried out. And she said “oh it’s nothing, nothing. Somebody’s very 
ill, that’s why.” But she knew where I will be… they will take me away 
from them. So I have been taken away to Bergen-Belsen with my child, 
with another two women who had two children, and the sick ones. To 
Bergen Belsen. 
 
Surviving a Nazi raid on the train arriving at Bergen Belsen in which “everybody died,” 
Polgar remarks that Bergen Belsen seemed no different from the harsh conditions of 
Auschwitz.  An infant almost always expected death: 
So I had enough milk to feed her for a while…. And one night I didn’t 
have enough to feed her. So I went out, I wanted to exchange something 
for food. And the croatz saw me, and they hit me. But so much that I even 
couldn’t crawl back to the child, to my lager, because I was unconscious 
until the next morning. I lied there in the snow. Until next morning I woke 
up, and crawled back. By the next morning I crawled back she was already 
dead. So, one of the Germans came, said “put her in your arms, kiss her 
goodbye, and throw her out.” So he took me not far from there where I 
was… and there was mountains and mountains of dead people. So I throw 
her out there. And he took me back. 
 
After highlighting various circumstances in which Polgar fought for her survival, she 
recalls the moment when she could not save herself and her child, whom she literally had 
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to “throw out.” In her contrast between mountains and mountains of dead people, she 
inadvertently suggests a natural order to the death of her child, who died in sleep. The 
moment seemed more traumatizing for Polgar, who adds: 
Sometimes I can’t sleep, I still remember. How it comes back. You can 
never forget anything like that in your life. It’s always there. Same like 
you can’t forget your parents… you can’t forget anything. 
 
When the interviewer asks if she remembers the circumstances of this death, Polgar 
admits to “still remembering.” She states, “You can never forget anything like that in 
your life” and affirms how the trauma “is always there,” as if survivors embody this 
experience: 
Interviewer: How old was she? 
Polgar: Just seven months old… when she was thrown out there. 
Interviewer: And what happened to you? You had been beaten just before 
that? 
Polgar: Yes. And then… when she died, I became very ill. First of all 
emotion. Second I had typhus… and I had an allergy, it was awful with 
different kinds of… things on my body. I was blowing up… I looked like 
a nine-month-old pregnant woman. My head was swollen, my neck was 
swollen… I had no hair. I looked dreadful and I felt dreadful. I felt like I 
will die tomorrow. And that went on with me quite a few days, a week, I 
can’t remember how many times. And one morning it was beautiful 
sunshine, I wasn’t… snow was not there anymore.  
 
In these words Polgar discloses her deep depression after her child died, and relates it to 
the physical illnesses she endured shortly after the child’s death. One can assume the life 
and death paradox within her child’s birth story, and the eventual traumatic death, almost 
brought Polgar to her death as well. But eventually it became easier, she admits, and out 
of her child’s death came Polgar’s own survival:  
Polgar:… I didn’t see much of it because I was very sick. And when my 
child died I was emotionally so sick I couldn’t care less if I see the next 
day. 
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Interviewer: what kept you going then? 
Polgar: My willpower. 
Interviewer: Well why did you… why would you have willpower? 
You’ve lost all your family, you’ve lost your child. 
Polgar: I wanted to see my sisters. And I wanted to see my husband. 
Because I knew already my parents were not alive. That kept me ongoing. 
 
Throughout Polgar’s testimony we see the interaction of life and death as well as 
moments of “choiceless choice.” Differently from Bergman, Polgar acknowledges the 
deep impact this experience had on her health. 
I came across Polgar’s interview in an initial search of “childrearing” related 
testimonies on the USC archives during my summer of data collection. I watched her 
testimony on July 4th weekend on a holiday visit to a friend’s farm in Vermont. As the 
cows moaned from the grass outside Polgar’s words “you can never forget anything like 
that in your life” reverberated. Yet, as I mentioned earlier, parts of her testimony did not 
make sense to me. How could she switch positions with her sister in roll call, I thought, 
and how did she hide a diamond in her mouth through initial arrival inspection? These 
unclear moments teach us how a traumatic event like becoming pregnant under the 
auspices of death can take new form in their representations years later. Not because they 
survivors did not want to remember them, but because instances of trauma cognitively 
store in the brain differently than non-traumatic memories. 
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Ruth 
 
… It wasn’t until the next day that Amelia came back from the clinic. I 
pleaded with her to see my mother. 
 
“She’ll be home soon.” Amelia tried to reassure me. “So will your baby 
sister.” 
“My baby sister?” 
“Her name is Ava,” Amelia said. “Thank God she’s all right. Your mother, 
too. The nurses strapped her to the delivery table and that’s when the 
bombs fell.” 
“Then what happened?” 
“Everyone ran down to the shelter.” 
“What about Mama?” 
“They just left her there on the table, all alone. They forced everyone to 
leave. But she’s all right, thank God,” she repeated, “And so is your 
sister.” 
“I want to see them.” 
“Tomorrow,” Amelia said, an air of finality in her voice. 
 
The next morning Amelia took me to see my mother and baby sister. 
When we started up the hospital stairs, planes roared overhead again. 
 
“Quick, put your arms over your head,” Amelia said. We huddled in the 
stairwell. Again, the explosions. We froze on the steps until the planes 
faded away. 
“Now let’s go up,” Amelia said. We entered the ward and found Mama in 
bed holding my baby sister. She smiled at me and motioned me over. I 
looked at my sister and kissed her on the forehead. She had a round face 
and fair, curly hair. She was sound asleep. 
 
“This is Ava,” Mama said. “Do you like that name?” 
 
I nodded enthusiastically. 
 
“But let’s not forget her nickname,” Aunt Amelia said. 
“Her nickname?” I asked. 
“Bombowiee,” Amelia said. “It means, ‘born with the bombs.’” 
All of our attention was on Ava at that moment. Mama and I hugged each 
other, and then she let me hold my baby sister. 
 
 
*  *  * 
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The above excerpt comes from the memoirs of a living survivor, Ruth, with 
whom I met in summer 2015. Her testimony, like Polgar’s, reflects how “choiceless 
choice” moments involving the life and death paradox can leave long-lasting effects on a 
survivor’s memory. 
I first met Ruth at July’s meeting for the Greater Boston Children’s Survivor’s 
group (GBCS). My networking led me to attend these monthly sessions, held at an older 
adult aging facility in Boston suburbs. I had been looking forward to this meeting for 
some time, really since I started attending in March, because my IRB cleared GCBS’s 
involvement in my research and finally permitted me to recruit interviewees. After a long 
announcement about my project and my work, the meeting began, and for three hours I 
participated in and listened to the lengthy conversation about survivors’ involvement in 
the latest Israeli current events at this time. When the meeting ended, a few survivors 
came over and asked to participate in my study. I then first met Ruth, a reserved older 
woman with grey hair and a delicate posture. In 1940 her mother gave birth to a baby girl 
whom the Nazis later killed in 1944, she said, and she asked if I find her story useful. 
We met at her house in the end of August—her choice of location, so that we had 
privacy, she said. It took us a few questions to feel comfortable with each other but 
eventually she opened up to me about life with her sister before deportation. Finally, too, 
she talked about the moment she lost her sister: 
…I know that my sister died, well was killed, I shouldn’t say died, in 
November of ’43. November of ’43 my sister died—was killed. She was 
shot along with all the other children whom they were able to find and lay 
their hands on. She was also in one of those hospital situations, she had 
had either scarlet fever or something like that, and they had isolated her in 
these so-called hospital barracks. And when they came to collect all the 
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children in November of ’43, from the labor camp, my father, my parents, 
and maybe my uncles help, were able to hide me. And they couldn’t get 
her out of the so-called hospital. So she was collected out of the hospital 
along with all the other children and then thrown onto a truck. My mother 
tried very hard to go with her and fought with them and was very severely 
beaten. And, um, they wouldn’t let her go. And she was taken away. And, 
um, [long pause] things got very hard after that. My mother was, I think, 
must have been in shock and depressed. And, um, then my father was sent 
away as well. And, um, … in July of ’44 my mother and I and my aunts … 
were sent to Auschwitz. And that was… that was that. 
 
Ruth doesn’t elaborate more on this story easily. It was not until minutes later that I 
realized I had not asked her the name of the baby. “Ava,” she responded, smiling. “Her 
name was Ava.”5 
Ruth’s testimony haunted me. I stayed in our interview for weeks, replaying the 
conversation and the many emotions it generated in my head. I could not let go of the 
fantasies she had about her sister’s death. She told me: 
You know, after it happened I remember that for years, including after the 
war, I had fantasies! About her, jumping off the truck, running through the 
forest, hiding in the forest, being found by somebody and saved. That was 
one of the narrative threads I created. There were others but I remember 
this one the most. And it was repetitive. That’s just how I processed it. 
And after the war I still, I know I must have thought about it a lot because 
I remember having a vision of her outside the window, at night. Her face 
peering into the window. Little things like that. [Pause] Hopes. Hopes that 
she could be alive.  
 
Of course these were simply fantasies, and Ruth’s way of rationalizing the death of her 
sister became imagining her survival in different fantasy experiences. It seemed to me 
like, in times of “choiceless choice,” when women felt so out of control over their own 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 5	  Name	  changed	  for	  the	  confidentiality	  of	  my	  participants	  
	   101	  
lives and the safety of their children, people rationalized to the best of their abilities the 
moments that faced them. 
Ruth’s mother did not engage with her in conversations about her sister. Ruth 
explains that her mother’s obligation as she saw it post-liberation involved mostly caring 
for her living daughter. Ruth never felt her mother’s dedication to be one-hundred percent 
sincere: 
I think she really withdrew emotionally. She withdrew emotionally 
because even though she put all her strength into protecting me, I think 
she protected herself by not being emotionally close to me. That’s what I 
think happened. ‘Cause I thought about it a lot. In therapy or something, 
and also I became a therapist. … 
 
Ruth also tells me she became a therapist but that her own trauma never fully subsided: 
 
It’s very hard. Very hard. In some ways it makes me think, reevaluate, 
gradually, everything. But also it’s very hard to be there. To remember. 
And I think it’s true probably of all survivors. That even though I spent 
years trying to move on, forget. It took many years until I realized you 
can’t do that. … When you find out you can’t do that, the adjustment 
continues. Rethinking, reorganizing everything. And I thought, oh because 
I had done so much work on myself, that it wouldn’t be the same for me as 
I get older, that it becomes more present and you think about it more, 
you’re more a way of thinking about it. You remember it more and you 
feel it more. And here it is! It happens. So there. ... I accept it. I am present 
with it. Sometimes I have to distract myself. Other times I take a walk. 
Things like that. 
 
 Like Polgar, we can see that many instances of “choiceless choice” involving life 
so closely tied to death leaves strong, embodied imprints in Ruth’s memory. On the way 
out of the interview, she handed me a copy of her memoir, from which I cite the 
introductory and concluding passages to her mother’s birth story of her younger sister 
during the Holocaust. As I read through it I thought back to my first meeting with Ruth, 
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when she walked over to me at the end of GBCS’s monthly meeting. “I have a story to 
tell you,” she whispered. “My mother gave birth. I am not sure if that matters to you.”  
“[Your mother gave birth] to you?” I asked? 
 
“No.” She frowned. “To my sister, who died—no, who was murdered—in 
1944.” 
 
At the end of our interview I asked Ruth if she has gotten more used to the survivor 
identity over the years. “Yes,” she said, and reminded me, “but it’s just one part of my 
identity.” Years after Ruth’s traumatic experience, she both struggles and finds some 
semblance of peace. And she moves back and forth between not only past and present but 
also life and death, imagining scenarios in which she and her sister could reunite in either 
existence. She could not control the circumstances then no more than she can control the 
aftermath of “choiceless choice” years later. 
 
*  *  * 
 
 
… “What happened?” I asked. 
“They took the children. 
Papa knelt down and held me close. I could feel  his body shake. “What 
about Mama?” I asked.  
“She’s all right. They beat her but she’s all right. She’s back in the 
barracks with your aunts.” 
“Where’s Ava?” I asked again, as if I had not comprehended my father’s 
answer the first time.   
“I don’t know,” he replied. “They put her on a truck” His voice trembled 
so much I could hardly make out the words: “They just threw her on the 
truck and drove away.” 
 
As usual, Mama reported for duty the next morning. She had bruises on 
her face and arms but refused to cry. “We cannot cry,” she said. 
 
Instead of crying, I imagined Ava jumping off the truck and hiding in the woods 
and somebody finding her and taking her in. I kept replaying the scene in my 
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mind with many variations. I never told Mama about my fantasies, but I wondered 
if she had them, too. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
Alternative Forms of Caregiving: 
Mothers, Doctors and Pregnancy in the Holocaust 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jd552VRbX5A  
(video, Maltz Museum of Jewish Heritage, 2013) – SHOULD WORK AS VIDEO 
EMBEDDED IN DOCUMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 In 2013 the Maltz Museum of Jewish Heritage in Cleveland, Ohio sponsored an 
exhibit called “Spots of Light: To be a Woman in the Holocaust.” Its ten-minute video 
featured survivors and scholars of the Holocaust who talk about the “female experience,” 
and implies that men could not possibly share certain memories with women because 
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they neither share the “experience itself” nor the memory. Although male survivors might 
easily relate to the “crowded transports” and “attempts to escape” in some of these 
women’s stories, the video assumes women went through horrific conditions because of 
their gender—particularly because of their ‘mothering’ nature. 
In the pages to follow, I examine stories of mothering and caretaking through a 
gendered lens to offer a new way through which we might understand the life and death 
paradox of pregnancy in the Holocaust. I argue that the setting’s changing and 
increasingly dangerous circumstances forced women and doctors into new caretaking 
roles, changing not only the meaning of “agency,” “choice,” and “trauma,” but also of 
“care.”  
 
 
(En)gendering Value in the Female Holocaust Experience 
The Maltz video presents survivor Rina Frankel and Holocaust educator Dr. 
Leatrice Rabinsky back-to-back, seemingly responding to each other about this notion of 
a female Holocaust experience. In the clip above, Rabinsky notes how  “women have a 
remarkable strength that quite often they don’t want to acknowledge,” and that strength 
involves “the deep willpower to achieve…to conquer obstacles in their way.” She notes 
that women survived particularly because of what she considers a natural female nature 
to succeed in overcoming challenging conditions. Women “give over to others if they 
know that they themselves will not be able to complete the task,” she states, “it’s a 
remarkable testimony [that] women have to impart to their female offspring.” Here, she 
somewhat naively states that women must continue telling their female descendants “you 
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can [survive], all you have to do is want it badly enough.” Without considering the 
numerous female victims who could not survive, despite “wanting it badly enough,” she 
still assumes that women in the Holocaust survived the atrocities because of this 
biological and cultural drive to “give over to others” and act in the face of danger. On a 
more basic level, she also assumes women had to make decisions one could not ask men 
to make. 
 Frankel appears in tone, “as Jews we have something inborn within us.” She 
continues, “It says  תרחבו 'םייחב  (ubeḥarta beḥayim)’ – you should choose life. And this is 
something that I think Jewish people strongly believe, that it is our duty to survive.” 
These words hang heavy in the exchange because they reference arguably one of the most 
sacred sections of the Jewish Torah, where Moses addresses the Israelites who have just 
sinned against God. At the close of his reprimand, he says “This day, I call upon the 
heaven and the earth as witnesses [that I have warned you]: I have set before you life and 
death, the blessing and the curse. You shall choose life, so that you and your offspring 
will live” (Deuteronomy 30:19). As Frankel cites Moses and captures the magnitude of 
this Jewish will to survive—to choose life— she arouses the Jewishness targeted in the 
Holocaust. She also affirms Rabinsky by agreeing that survival for Jews depend on their 
nature, and a shared history where survival is a necessity. 
This survival theme then quickly becomes about gender, specifically about female 
strength. Rabinksy notes: 
… The ability of some of these women to go beyond the pain that was 
inflicted upon them, to think in a sense that there has to be a survivor to 
tell about this… and to protect their children by seeing that they were able 
not only to have more sustenance and to eat, and to take over the duties 
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and responsibilities of the younger ones so that the younger ones would 
have strength to go on and not to be beaten. And the mothers took this 
upon themselves. 
 
Here, Rabinsky asserts that women during the Holocaust “protected their children” by 
making it possible for the younger ones to “have strength to go on.” She generalizes the 
female nature to shelter children from harm, from “being beaten,” implying that mothers 
saved their children as much as possible during the time of unimaginable and horrific 
life-threatening occurrences. Frankel’s words reiterate a similar theme, as she says, “I 
think a mother would do almost anything. I’ve seen it done, just to help the children and 
to keep them alive.” She then speaks from her own Holocaust narrative, attributing at 
least part of her survival to her mother’s actions: “I think that’s what motivated [my 
mother]… she was always the last, when we were eating or whatever we were doing. She 
put herself last. It was for the children.” 
In earlier chapters we saw women putting the lives of their children above their 
own, but it takes too much a universalistic approach to claim all mothers do this 
instinctively. Nancy Scheper-Hughes’ work on “mother love and child death” offers a 
cross cultural inquiry into “the individual and the personal as well as the collective and 
cultural dimensions of maternal practices in an environment hostile to the survival and 
wellbeing of mothers and infants” (Scheper-Hughes 1993:340). On motherhood, she 
states: 
Mother love is anything other than natural and instead represents a matrix 
of images, meanings, sentiments, and practices that are everywhere 
socially and culturally produced….women create their own culture, but 
they do not create it just as they please or under circumstances chosen by 
themselves (Scheper-Hughes 1993:341-342).  
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When we think of this idea in relation to Frankel’s words that “a mother would do almost 
anything…just to help the children and to keep them alive,” we can see how Frankel and 
Rabinksy label “the nature of Jews” exactly what Sheper-Hughes calls “a cultural 
construction.” Mothers created their own “culture” of caregiving despite not choosing the 
circumstances under which they lived. To assume that Jewish motherhood became part of 
the Holocaust survival narratives would ignore the plethora of “choices” and forms of 
“care” to which actual women reacted in the camps, ghettos, and in hiding. 
Sara Horowitz claims that “women may remember differently from men--or they 
may remember different things [and] missing from male versions of survival are 
experiences unique to women, such as...pregnancy in the concentration camps” 
(Horowitz: 366). Similarly, Rochelle Saidel words that “biological differences between 
the sexes….gave women in Ravensbruck unique women’s experience” and that “female 
physiological conditions made women especially vulnerable in concentration camps” 
(Saidel 2004:210). This idea that women suffered a “different” fate has emerged in 
Holocaust literature to support a claim that the circumstances of the Holocaust generated 
gendered experiences. Dalia Ofer notes how “Nazi policy targeted all Jews as Jews, and 
the primary status of Jews was their ‘race’ not their gender.” She claims that an 
unintended consequence of studying Holocaust experience results in this “gendered” 
approach (Ofer 1999:2-3), and urges readers to consider the idea of a gendered narrative 
but to simultaneously not pay much attention to it. 
Women who became pregnant during the Holocaust did make caregiving 
decisions men did not have to make. I do not intend to insinuate men had no challenges 
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faced only by them, and I aim to avoid altogether a “hierarchy of trauma” that can be 
applied to a comparison of narratives. But female survivors who became pregnant do 
recall different experiences from men, simply because of the particularly calculated harm 
Nazis placed upon them. 
 
 
A Counterargument to “Gendered Suffering” 
In Gendered Suffering: Women in Holocaust Testimonies, Dr. Lawrence Langer 
claims that “listening to the voices of women who survived those domains reminds us of 
the severely diminished role that gendered behavior played during those cruel years” 
(Langer: 1998:43). He frames his article with a clear critique against the literature cited 
above, which posits testimony from women as valuable gendered construction of the 
Holocaust narrative. He presents his argument as logically on paper as he does with me in 
person almost twenty years after its publication: the context of the Holocaust experience 
suspends all present-day conceptions of life, and places all circumstances and conditions 
in an equally disturbing context of death. Therefore, “because it could never be 
segregated from the murder of the many, the survival of the few cannot be a measure of 
why some women survived and others did not” (Langer 1998: 43). In his opinion, one 
cannot attribute survival to something existing in a person’s “nature.” 
 What better way to understand this idea than birthing in(to) death? Langer 
considers ‘motherhood’ in testimony a viable path by which he might further explore this 
question of a gendered Holocaust experience, and I reference his examples in detail to 
bring to light the stories we discussed together in person over the course of my fieldwork. 
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He admits how “one biological feature of their gender, the capacity to bear children, has 
had a singular impact on [women’s] efforts to confront their ordeal, an impact that they 
could not and cannot share with male inmates” (Langer 1998: 46). He also acknowledges 
that “the phenomenon of maternity continues to haunt them” (Langer 1998: 46), and 
offers testimonies that discuss in detail situations of pregnancy and ‘mothering’ under the 
context of the Holocaust to consider whether this permits a “gendered analysis” to the 
study of Holocaust testimony. 
One survivor in particular, Arina B., whom we discussed in person, gave birth in 
Majdanek to a baby boy but never saw the child after delivery. Langer quotes her words 
of endless despair, citing her saying “I don’t want to live. I want to die with my baby, 
give me my baby” (Langer 1998: 51). When we talked about this in person Langer 
recognizes existing criticism against him for his negation that these testimonies highlight 
different experiences for women in the Holocaust than men, but maintains his stance (just 
as in his article) that “a birth moment is a death moment” (Langer 1998:51) and birthing a 
child the Nazis will ultimately murder represents just one of many facets of death in the 
general Holocaust experience. 
 Of the many testimonies Langer quotes in this article, we watched three of them 
together. These meetings with Langer became my own ritual in the course of my 
fieldwork, and we often sat side by side in his sunroom watching testimonies, raw 
footage, documentaries—anything on the Holocaust that interested either of us. The 
longer we knew each other the more personal these conversations became, but in January 
of 2015 we still hardly knew each other. This was when he first played for me a VHS 
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compilation of women testimonies he said he used for a conference, and I had heard 
through the academic grapevine that once at a panel on Holocaust testimony in the ‘90s 
Langer made some contentious claims about the unnecessary attention paid to gender in 
Holocaust testimonies. Until I read this article I had no idea the tape we watched together 
was that same tape he used in that notorious lecture. There we sat watching the testimony 
of Joly Z., who says: 
There was a pregnant woman among us. She must have been in a very 
early pregnancy when she got in the camp. Beautiful woman. I remember 
her eyes always shining…. The time had come and she had to deliver…. I 
prepared the little box with some soft rags for the baby. And in the other 
room I heard suddenly the cry of the baby.  Never saw or remembered 
before a newborn baby. And I was waiting for the baby with the little box 
in my hand. And then a tall SS man brought out the baby holding him or 
her upside down. And put it under the sink, and opened the water, and he 
said ‘here you go little Moses, down the stream.’ And drowned the little 
baby (Langer 1998: 49). 
 
A mother watching a Nazi murder her newborn might suffer post-traumatic stress 
disorder, or other forms of mental illness. Men who had their own horrific experiences 
might also suffer similar diagnoses, leading Langer to argue a lack of gendered dynamics 
in Holocaust stories. But I wondered then, as I do now, how we can construct these 
stories in other contexts; the very nature of women delivering babies only to watch them 
die makes that traumatic experience inherently gendered. Shocked and stunned, I moved 
from testimony to testimony with Langer, appreciating very much his willingness to re-
watch this footage with me. 
 Langer references these testimonies and several others to dismiss their value as 
“gendered” Holocaust experiences by writing: 
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… if we substitute for these gendered terms the more generic ones of 
parent and child, we move [the women I have been discussing] into a 
human orbit that unites them through a kind of regret that cannot be 
sorted by sex. To be sure, pregnancy and childbirth are biologically 
unique experiences, and we have heard how they have been endured 
under unbearable conditions. But [in examining] testimony involving not 
only a wife, husband, and infant but also the daughter of the witness by a 
second marriage…we may glimpse the danger of overstating the 
importance of biologically unique experience. (Langer 1998: 56). 
 
Langer’s main point does not diminish the stories of these women altogether; on the 
contrary, he battles the gendered Holocaust experience concept by arguing how applying 
a gendered interpretation removes the story from the true context of death and horror and 
assumes a constructed hierarchy. But he wrongfully assumes these two theories as 
mutually exclusive. I do not negate devastation as the core of the Holocaust; in fact, a 
gendered analysis of pregnancy in the Holocaust illuminates the extreme paradox of 
death within the life. 
 
 
A Survivor’s Interpretation of Her Mother’s Changing Role 
…All knowledge about women, gender, and Judaism is mediated through 
a series of interpretive frames and explanatory frameworks. 
-Miriam Peskowitz and Laura Levitt 
 
 Hena is a well-known child-psychiatrist popular for both her psychological 
publications and her talks about her Holocaust experience. We initially met three years 
ago when—after meeting her in a class at Brandeis—she hired me to help reorganize her 
massive book collection. Upon my return to Boston we rekindled our friendship, and she 
became a mentor with whom I talked about the Holocaust, psychoanalysis, and other 
general life occurrences. In January 2015 we talked about her experiences in Auschwitz 
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as a teenaged Hungarian Jew, who lost her two brothers and father but survived two 
“visits” to Auschwitz with her mother. 
 I asked Hena to elaborate on her surviving with her mother, about whom she talks 
to this day with respect, love, and praise. She said: 
You know… luckily I have access to about forty letters that my mother 
wrote to my aunt who, in the meantime, went from Hungary, after the war, 
to… Israel… and I learned from these letters my mother wrote to my aunt 
that people envied us in the camps, a mother and a daughter. It was a very 
rare situation. Because if you were a teenager as I was, the mothers would 
be too old to survive. And my mother, I think knowing what was 
happening in Auschwitz, she oriented herself pretty quickly to the 
situation. She held my hand, she argued when we came back to 
Auschwitz… she kept telling them that she could still work. So we were 
very lucky that she managed to stay with me …  
 
In her words we see similar notions about motherhood and Jewish women surviving 
together; while her story speaks to the “mothering” between her mother and her at the 
camp, they really highlight the similar caregiving theme we see in the previous stories. 
New conditions forced Hena to assume a more dominant role as caretaker, “orienting 
herself pretty quickly to the situation” to keep herself and her daughter alive. Hena 
confirms this not just in her interview but also in several meetings throughout the year, 
one of which was in her car as we navigated the Berkshires together on a weekend visit. 
She told me, “my mother … was extraordinarily resourceful. She used headscarves to 
keep her head covered so that she looked younger in selection… and she knew how to 
stand in line at selection so as not to be seen, or to be seen as healthy…[she] was a very 
intelligent woman.” 
Hena highlights the resourceful nature of her mother to claim that she, too, 
survived because of the intellect and willpower her mother possessed. In many 
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conversations she literally attributes her survival to the fact that she stayed with her 
mother for the entire experience.  But I learned from her, too, that some mothers had 
children who kept them going. In this way, the caregiving responsibilities in the direst of 
circumstances became reciprocal:  
I did not know how lucky I was to have her. But I was very conscious of 
how much…much more… in danger she was at not being able to make it 
through with the hunger and hard labor, and all the stuff we had to do. So I 
was very protective of her. I was pretty much the physical caretaker. I took 
good care of her, whenever I could. Like finding water to wash her up one 
night, and giving her some of my food. Just… things like that. She made 
it. 
 
Similarly, she writes: 
So my blessed ignorance remained relatively undisturbed. And blessed it 
was. It helped me to focus on the day-to-day, moment-by-moment events, 
something mother could not do. She was forty-six years old, and her 
energy was quickly disappearing. And the glasses she had worn all her life 
were taken away from her when we arrived in Auschwitz. I became my 
mother’s eyes and hands and she, in turn, used her brains for the both of 
us. 
 
These words signify reciprocity of caregiving between mother and daughter, implying 
they kept each other alive. By telling me “I was pretty much the physical caretaker” and 
“I took good care of her whenever I could,” she takes Rabinksy and Frankel’s discussion 
even further and claims a role for (adult) daughters as caregivers to their mothers in the 
Holocaust experience. One might assume mothers kept mothering because their children 
helped keep them alive; that the children adapted to the new context of the Holocaust by 
fueling the changes in roles of caretaking. 
 I asked Hena if her mother ever discussed her feelings of living in the Holocaust 
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Oh during? You see, Staci, my memory doesn’t go that far. Maybe we did. 
Maybe we didn’t. I cannot say “oh we never did.” I cannot say “we did all 
the time.” I remember thinking about my father. Worrying about losing 
him, and then recognizing that at his age—he was 61 and his mother was 
96—he couldn’t have possibly survived. But, uh… after the war, when my 
mother lived with us… we certainly did not talk nearly as much about my 
brothers as I wished we had. Only when I had my children and my 
grandchildren did I think “how can anybody survive the loss of your…” 
 
Then she stumbled on her words a bit, and picked up again: 
 
Only because everybody suffered the same fate. Everybody suffered the 
same fate. And that sharing, uh, just you didn’t feel so singled out [...] this 
woman… I’ve forgotten her name. But she told me that when she was 
pregnant it was then that she fully appreciated the losses that her mother 
suffered. I don’t think her mother had any children there but maybe her 
brothers. 
 
On the one hand, Hena recognizes very clearly that “everybody suffered the same fate.” 
In fact, she repeats this statement, as if to confirm its truth. But on the other hand, Hena 
notes that having children and becoming a mother allowed for her to conceptualize her 
mother’s experiences, apart from her own. She also later points to a woman she knew 
who claimed that motherhood offered for her the awareness of her mother’s own 
suffering in the loss of her children. In this light, Hena signifies the ways these stories 
pertain to female experiences of mothering. 
“Mothering” as a form of caretaking connects these women to each other during 
and after the Holocaust. Hena’s mother both took care of her and accepted help in return, 
essential help which saved her life. She attributes their survival to this exchange, while 
also signifying how becoming a mother to her own children after the war allowed for her 
– and for her friend – to relate to the past experiences and to grasp the individual and 
deeply emotional nature of mothering in times of such distress.  
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Sientje Backer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-USC Shoah Foundation 
Sientje Backer provides an account of physical and emotional stress that began 
with her pregnancy and lasted through the delivery of her child and extending into her 
time in a concentration camp. Her story, however, also reflects an alternative form of 
mothering during the Holocaust. Born January 24, 1914 in Amsterdam, Backer speaks to 
her USC Shoah Foundation interviewer about the dilemma many Jewish pregnant women 
faced regarding reporting pregnancies once the Nazis began occupying the Netherlands: 
In 1942 I was pregnant again. And…they said if you are pregnant or have 
your own baby they won’t take you. So I reported…when I got paper that 
I had to report…I told [the officer] I was pregnant. And they said I had to 
come and see a German doctor… I was just pregnant then, couldn’t see 
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anything, and I took a pillow and put it under my dress, what was a big 
risk because he could have told me ‘I want to examine you.’ But I didn’t 
that far. I just put a pillow under my dress, I went to the officer, and I 
registered. And he said ‘how far pregnant are you?’ And…I said “about 
four months.” And he said ‘I want you to come back here in six months.’ 
…And of course I never reported back again. 
 
Backer’s plan falsely reveals pregnancy from the Nazi officer involved much risk. 
Though she tells this part of her pregnancy story anecdotally, it illustrates the strategic 
gamble her decision-making process. She could not have known how the officer would 
respond, or whether the concealed pillow would be discovered. Nonetheless, she knew 
not to return after the baby was born. 
 Backer skips through the story of her birth, only offering that she immediately 
found hiding places for her children in order to eliminate any chance of their 
deportations. The absence of detail perhaps covers over the tremendous loss of giving the 
children away immediately after her second birth. She was deported not long after the 
delivery, and her physical condition added to the other natural traumas of life in a 
concentration camp: 
When I came to the camp I couldn’t nurse anymore. I was in agony because 
the milk was coming and there was nothing that could take it away from 
me. There was no help. And I went to the nursery and asked the nurse if 
they could do something for me. And she said ‘do you have a baby?’ I said 
‘no, I had a miscarriage.’ Because I was afraid to say I had a baby and she 
may ask ‘where is she’ or whatever… 
 
While Backer felt the need to protect her family, she also felt a strong sense of duty as a 
new mother in the camp. After initially seeking out help from a nurse for her discomfort 
from engorged breasts, she had the opportunity to take part in breastfeeding infants in the 
camp: 
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[the nurse] said ‘I have some babies here that are dying, really because 
there’s nothing, no milk in the camp. And they need food badly. They 
cannot eat yet, they can just drink.’ So she said ‘would you feed them for 
me?’ And I said ‘yes.’ So she gave me the first baby, and that baby was 
like a dish towel hanging over my arm because she was really dying… and 
I nursed the baby and you could really see her coming back to life…. And 
then when she was satisfied they brought me second baby, and it was the 
same story all over again…. And then the third baby. I fed three babies. 
 
This new mother in the concentration was happy to take part in the nursing of Jewish 
infants. In some sense, Backer’s choices to assist the nurses sustained Jewish babies who 
stood at the brink of death while connecting her to them. She wanted to continue for as 
long as possible, but her husband disagreed with her choice to help, and pleaded with her 
to stop immediately: 
And then they asked me if I would come everyday…and I was willing to 
do that. But I said I have to talk it over with my husband… he was still in 
the camp then. And he said ‘I don’t think it’s a good idea because if you 
keep on going that your strength will go down, and if they ship you 
through you have two children that… one of us has to come back to the 
children.’ I hear him say that. And…’if you keep on feeding the children 
you won’t have a chance to survive.’ So as hard as it was, I had to give it 
up. 
 
This, in itself, was also a strategic to make. Backer successfully nursed three babies and 
could have potentially nursed more in safety. Babies—albeit, very few—did survive the 
Holocaust because of efforts like Backer’s. Though she ultimately stopped because of her 
husband’s decision about the physical strain of nursing on her body, it is difficult to know 
what she would have decided if she had been on her own. Her story calls our attention to 
the degree to which a woman’s decision regarding her own body remained somewhat 
beyond her control, and to new roles of caregiving established by the context of the 
Holocaust. It also draws our attention to moments when people decide to give and 
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withhold “care,” not knowing the full boundaries between making a “free decision” and 
making one closely tied to death. 
 
 
Doctors and Pregnancy in the Holocaust: Caregiving (or lack thereof) 
Henriette Wiegmink 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-USC Shoah Foundation 
Henriette Wiegmink, born on Jan 22, 1912 in Amsterdam, Netherlands, was 
interviewed at her home after the war by an interviewer from the USC Shoah Foundation. 
I watched her testimony during my research collection in Brown. Sitting comfortably in 
her armchair, she discusses finding out about her pregnancy while living in occupied 
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Netherlands and the accommodations that she needed to make in order to secure safety 
for herself and her family: 
My doctor confirmed that I was pregnant. I thought that I was three 
months pregnant. I thought that might perhaps be my saving, so I was 
rather optimistic at the time for myself…I wanted to have proof that I was 
pregnant and was going to have a baby and so I couldn’t be considered 
like the other ones, you know?...[A friend] said I must go to the doctor. 
Now, we had a doctor who lived in the neighborhood where we lived… 
and this doctor was so unpleasant to me. He said ‘oh no they won’t do you 
anything, and I don’t know why you came here, and if you are married to 
a gentile they won’t do anything. I don’t believe the Germans will do 
anything.’ So that was not worth anything and I was very disappointed. 
 
Wiegmink thought her pregnancy would ‘make her unlike the other ones.’ This 
presumably refers to the early stages of Nazi occupation of the Netherlands, when Nazis 
would deport selected Jews to labor camps. Wiegmink hoped her pregnancy might save 
her from deportation or other impending harm.  
 This interaction with a neighborhood doctor exemplifies how serious a threat 
Nazis posed to her life, and the interactions and situations women found themselves in. 
Even some educated, respected members of the community such as this doctor rejected 
any notion that the Nazi invasion of the Netherlands meant harm for Wiegmink or Jewish 
pregnant women in general. Wiegmink understood already that she needed to better 
secure safety for herself and her family, so she employed many different options of aid: 
And then I went another day [to a hospital], on recommendation of a 
gentile… she did a lot in the underground, and she thought she may be 
able to do something…. There was other underground people in that 
hospital and I had to go there. It was a miserable neighborhood where I 
went to. And at that moment I didn’t have any hope anymore. But I 
thought maybe she could do something…. I was really down. I walked 
through that street and it was a miserable day. There was no sun, it was 
not warm. And…so difficult to talk about… anyway it was as if 
everything became lighter. And I had feeling, got hundred percent right 
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feeling that everything would still be end alright. And I’ve always 
wondered what that was. 
 
Wiegmink does not elaborate on the actual birth of her child the way as she does on the 
details surrounding her pregnancy. In the end she did receive a ‘normal’ hospital 
delivery, but her circumstances varied drastically from those of non-Jewish pregnant 
women around her. Doctors, in this story, assumed different roles, as they ignored all 
responsibilities they had to Jewish patients.  
Wiegmink’s testimony speaks to a strong sense of hope women felt in this 
circumstance, despite the deep pressure to find security in an incredibly stressful 
pregnancy, which at times left her feeling helpless and unhappy. It also addresses how 
moments of care – in her case, from the underground – could transform her experiences 
from the worse to the better. She was no longer alone. The search for aid gave Wiegmink 
a sense of meaning, and she now “had a feeling” that things would work out in the end.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   122	  
Lennie Jade 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
-USC Shoah Foundation 
Lennie Jade, born on October 12, 1922 in Aalten, Netherlands, went into hiding in 
1942 after her father found several farmers to hide his entire immediate family. Jade 
married a town Rabbi very early in the relationship so that her father would allow them to 
hide together. About her pregnancy, Jade remarks: 
I got…I became pregnant. How and who I don’t know…we slept four 
people in the bed. But we didn’t know how long the war would last and 
my husband of course was religious….  
 
Jade immediately defends her pregnancy in various ways. First, she speaks to the loose 
physical and sexual boundaries that existed in the small hiding space where she and 
several other people shared one bed. Next, she mentions the unknown trajectory of time, 
signifying how uncomfortable it made her in hiding to not know how long it would last. 
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Finally, she considers her husband’s religious convictions, which supported the Jewish 
religious commandment to procreate. Perhaps Jade provides all of these reasons to refute 
the idea that conceiving or carrying a pregnancy to term at such a horrific time in Jewish 
history was irresponsible. 
 Jade does not speak of her pregnancy with ease but instead with anxiety and pain. 
In fact, most of her pregnancy story speaks to the challenges of birthing children during 
the Holocaust: 
So in the meantime I got pregnant…and it was very foolish…. I had a hard 
time…with bringing the child into the world because in the first place, it 
was very hard…. it was not an easy pregnancy. 
 
Jade elaborates on the ethical dilemma, and also the uncertainty and danger.  The fact that 
she could not access stable reproductive healthcare adds to the difficulties of the 
pregnancy. She, like most Jewish women who were pregnant while in hiding, had to find 
resources quietly, in whatever ways she could: 
So when the time came that…the baby was due, I was in terrible pain and 
the people were there and I had to put a pillow over my head because I 
couldn’t scream. And nothing happened. My husband and my brother 
were holding me…for four days I was in labor…and this woman who was 
hiding us didn’t want to go to the doctor to tell us it was time… she knew 
it all, and in the meantime I was almost dying, and the baby too… and my 
husband then says to her ‘if you don’t want to go, I go. And if I get caught 
you will be caught too. It doesn’t matter what will happen. I can’t see her 
like this.’ I was more dead than alive. So she finally decided to go to the 
doctor. The doctor came, and she said it was horrible because I was no 
good anymore. I was having fever… so he helped me get the baby. 
 
Jade expresses disbelief in the fact that the woman hiding her would not help her deliver 
safely. The birth of her child nearly becomes the moment of her own death. Though the 
lack of sterile equipment, light, and other necessary resources left Jade physically ill, she 
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fought through the aggressive delivery of her child and the moments that immediately 
followed. The underground movement from which she sought help found a safe hiding 
spot for her baby:  
…In the meantime the doctor took care of me and then the baby was gone 
and I got sick and he got sick, because they made an incision and it was full 
of water… So I said to them, ‘I don’t care where he is, just tell me he is 
safe.’ And they told me he is safe. And I said ‘so now I can die.’ But I 
didn’t die, thank god…. 
 
Jade discusses separating from her child with some relief, as she mostly wanted to make 
sure her son was safe. This moment of candidness in her testimony clarifies the life and 
death nature of the situation when doctors stopped providing care for Jewish pregnant 
women in the Holocaust. 
 
Eddie Zomer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- USC Shoah Foundation 
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Eddie Zomer born on December 24, 1915 in Amsterdam, Netherlands, and she 
lived in the city at the beginning of the occupation. She reflects on complications in her 
pregnancy that resulted from both physical distress and the necessity of secrecy: 
… Because we couldn’t take risk of nothing…I had to have it at home. 
And we had a midwife and she is supposed to do, you know, to come at 
home. And everything was arranged for that, and on the very end I 
couldn’t stay home. I had to go to the hospital because it had to be a 
cesarean. And that doctor couldn’t do it so he said ‘you have to go to 
another doctor.’ And we were very much afraid for another doctor 
because we couldn’t tell him anything. We couldn’t say ‘I have to go to a 
hospital but I cannot go to a hospital.’ 
 
In order to have required a cesarean, Zomer presumably exhibited signs of complications. 
Her physical body was under a great deal of stress. However, these circumstances 
ostensibly affected her emotional and psychological status as well. At a moment when 
Zomer was already worrying about the stress on her pregnancy, her circumstances and 
conditions required her to also fear discovery and deportation. To tell the doctor or not to 
tell the doctor depended on what Zomer considered her best option.  
 Zomer also ponders a moment when she sought help from the resistance. Here, 
she recounts her birth story with urgency, exuding the sense of terror she felt at the 
beginning of the birth of her child: 
And so we had a friend who was by the underground. And we asked him 
about a certain doctor that the other doctor gave me up, if he could get 
some information, what and how he is. Is he pro-German or whatever, is 
he a Nazi or whatever, ‘cause we couldn’t believe anybody. You know, 
you couldn’t trust anybody. And when he came back with the word that he 
is very good, you can trust him, so we went to that doctor. And he told me 
then that day the baby will come and it has to be cesarean. I have to go to 
the hospital. 
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Zomer reveals how she strategized to give birth in hiding to guarantee as much 
concealment as possible. She points us toward another component of the challenging 
process of Jewish birthing during the Holocaust—trust. The way she discusses her doctor 
highlights this concept as well: 
So, when we went back we didn’t tell him anything, he already arranged 
for the room, but we didn’t tell him we were Jewish. We couldn’t. So when 
we went back…my husband said, ‘well there’s one thing we can do, we 
have to tell him. There’s no other way. We have to take the risk.’ So he 
went back to the doctor and he said ‘doctor I have to tell you something.’ 
So he said ‘listen, we are Jewish. What does that mean?’ So [the doctor] 
said ‘why?’ So [my husband] said ‘well, we cannot go to a hospital.’ So 
[the doctor] said ‘don’t worry, I make everything okay.’ So he was very, 
very good. So I had my baby in the hospital… 
 
This doctor made it possible for the birth in the hospital, but other pregnant Jewish 
women did not know someone who could “make everything oayk.” Zomer decided based 
on word of mouth, trust, and hope. And she was lucky. No one decision could protect her 
or her child from capture or imprisonment. 
 
 
Conclusion: Building Community, and Care-ful Giving 
 Sara Horowitz urges us to consider the fact that: 
Pregnancy comes to mean different things in different accounts… The 
way a pregnant mother grapples with her condition, the response of the 
other women, and the treatment she receives from the Nazis, make 
pregnancy testify to the strength or fragility of the intimate bonds that tie 
human lives together (Horowitz 1998: 371). 
 
In the end these are stories of strength and fragility, but they are also stories about how 
the context of the Holocaust established new roles for mothers and doctors. Survivors still 
remain silent about these moments, reminding us of the silence we find in the literature 
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surrounding women’s pregnancies during the Holocaust. But we have much to learn from 
these stories, and the women who cared for each other in times of extreme, unimaginable 
distress. 
In the pages above, I highlight many instances where Jewish women provided 
love and support to each other when they needed it the most. The assumption that this 
caregiving came from a biological or Jewish ‘natural instinct’ undermines the fact that 
women, over centuries, have become pregnant for countless reasons. The Judaic 
emphasis on childbearing is, of course, only one particular reason why women have 
children. Earlier chapters addressed this possible essentialization by complicating the 
terms “agency,” “survival, and “trauma.”  Though “caregiving” played a role in those 
stories, I placed the emphasis on the other terms; in this chapter, I aimed to do the 
opposite. Horowitz's statement asks us to consider what women actually say when they 
retell their survivor stories. The stories above show us that many women speak of the 
presence and absence of intimacy: they speak to the nature of “care” in horror, in a world 
built mostly on death. Therefore, they both illuminate and complicate narrow definition 
of ‘mothering’ and ‘doctoring’—of what “care” could mean.   
Frederik Klaits talks about love and caregiving in Botswana during an HIV/AIDS 
crisis. He writes, 
A person’s care, love, scorn, and jealousy all influence the physical 
well-being of others by communicating the quality of his or her “heart” 
(pelo). Thus, care and love enhance people’s potential over the long 
term, while scorn and jealousy curtail it. Love and care for others ideally 
enable them to prosper…. Furthermore, one’s sentiments are not entirely 
one’s own; they are shaped by those of others, and influence them in 
turn. Thus, the love “given” by a person may evoke love on the part of 
those who “receive,” “see,” or “hear” or “feel” it (Klaits 2010: 6). 
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Klaits underscores that “love” carries many meanings in different settings. For the people 
of Botswana on whom Klaits elaborates, love is shaped among and between 
communities. People benefit from “communicating the quality of [their] ‘heart[s],” not 
only physically but emotionally as well. They survive when they connect, not unlike the 
stories I analyze above. 
 Take, for example, Sienje Backer’s breastfeeding in the camps, or even Hena’s 
story of surviving Auschwitz with her mother. To this day, Hena cannot move through 
her survival without attesting her life to her mother’s wits, and she continues by 
explaining “we formed communities because we had to; we looked after one another and 
that got us through it.” And Backer demonstrates the same sentiments when she cared for 
other women’s babies after placing her own in hiding—two drastically different forms of 
“caregiving.” These circumstances do not generally fall under normal constructions of 
“caregiving,” but I argue that because the Holocaust did not contain “normal” 
circumstances of any kind, we simply need to broaden what we mean. “Caregiving” and 
“love” existed in similar ways to Klaits’ informants: between and among people who 
needed each other in order to beat death and win life. 
 In the stories of care from doctors, we see a more complicated use of the word 
“care.” Like the stories of Jade and Zomer, many women remember receiving skewed 
versions of medical care (even in hospitals). Zomer, on the one hand, seemed fortunate 
for the opportunity to birth in the hospital—an opportunity many women did not receive. 
But, she focuses on the very serious lack of trust both she and her husband felt for the 
doctor. In cases like this, women did not know whether they would survive a hospital 
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visit and an illegal birth; some doctors worked for and with the Nazis, and, after enough 
stories of torture and abuse, Jews felt they could trust no one. Zomer received better 
medical attention than others, who, like Jade, could not always access medical attention 
easily. Either doctors or non-Jewish “aids” acted anti-sematic themselves, and refused to 
provide healthcare or assistance, or they Nazis placed them under the same threats they 
placed Jews. Regardless, people did look out for each other when circumstances allowed. 
We cannot say everyone cared for one other because many survivors discuss the fight for 
survival that occurred between Jews in the concentration camps. But for people who 
formed communities, “care” became about social support as much as it did physical. 
 I turn back to the Maltz video and to Nancy Scheper-Hughes’ notion of 
“motherlove.” I do not take a solid stance on the “gendered Holocaust narrative” issue at 
the onset of introducing these caregiving stories because I deliberately framed the stories 
around the mere question of a gendered Holocaust experience. But Nancy Scheper-
Hughes seemingly responds to this video by confronting the assumption that motherhood 
comes from a natural drive in women. This kind of thinking takes our interpretation of 
these stories as “extreme cases” and generalizes them so that women in the Holocaust act 
like all women act, wanting babies and saving them. This logic simply cannot extend to 
every case of birth and caregiving. In fact, the stories from this chapter refute the notion 
altogether and draw upon Scheper-Hughes’ cultural analysis that society constructs the 
role of “the mother,” which looks different cross-culturally. Women of the Holocaust 
who became pregnant cared for each other and for their (or others’) babies as a means of 
connection. This connection did not save all Jews from their horrific fates, but many 
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survivors who were able to forge these bonds do attest their survival to the culture of 
caregiving which emerged from the darkness. 
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CONCLUSION	  
 
 
After Birth Comes “Afterdeath” 
Revisiting the Life and Death Paradox of Pregnancy in the Holocaust 
 
 
 
 
 
I’ve come back from another world  
to the world 
I had not left 
and I know not 
which one is real 
tell me did I really come back 
from the other world? 
As far as I’m concerned 
I’m still there 
dying there 
a little more each day 
dying over again 
the death of those that died 
and I no longer know which is the real one 
the world, right here 
or the world over there 
now 
I no longer know 
when I am dreaming 
and when 
I do not dream. 
 
Charlotte Delbo 
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Introduction 
Bessy K. sits on the left side of a couch, in a floral dress up to her neck and a 
black blazer. She has tissues in her pocket and she fidgets with them, looking at the 
camera with sad, droopy eyes. She offers the tissues to her husband, who sits on the right 
side of the same couch wearing a jacket and tie. His arm rests in the middle, and his hand 
almost touches her shoulder but does not quite make it. “I had a baby boy, and uh, I 
didn’t have food for the baby so I took milk from my breast and sold to other mothers for 
a piece of soap, potatoes…” she says. She explains how she soothed the baby, comforted 
him. She then mentions how she went to a doctor for lumps in her breasts, and that the 
doctor informed her she needed an operation to remove puss. 
Germans took her baby. She claims that she “wasn’t prepared for it,” and then 
says, “I wasn’t there, even.” Meaning she was not conscious—or at least not active—
during the removal of her son. “I handed him the bundle,” she says, adding, “this is the 
last time I had the bundle.” She remains sad. This is a moment in her story from which 
she clearly feels traumatized. The camera pans to Bessy K’s husband, who looks on but 
says nothing. He, too, wears a matching solemn expression. He sits stiff. Still. All the 
while she continues, “as I look back I don’t think I had anyone with me. I was alone. And 
from that time on I was alone. To me I was dead. I died. I didn’t want to know anything. I 
didn’t want to talk about it. I didn’t want to admit this happened to me.” Her deep 
loneliness echoes in the way she declares her eternal state of being alone, and in the 
declaration of her death. But with her husband sitting next to her, she is neither physically 
alone nor dead.  
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 Her interviewer does not interrupt and asks very few questions; instead, Bessy K. 
leads us through this experience of losing her child during the Holocaust. She refers to a 
moment when she ran into a former doctor from before the war, and says “later I saw 
again the doctor who assisted in the delivery. She said ‘How’s the baby?’ I said, ‘what 
baby?’ I didn’t remember giving birth. That’s what it did to me.” 
 
*   *   * 
 
“Afterdeath,” Continued 
 In Chapter Two, “The Death Camp’s Birth Car,” I discussed watching a VHS of 
birth testimonies with Lawrence Langer. This video included Bessy K.’s testimony. The 
first time I watched her story I remembered few details, but her words “to me I was 
dead…I Died…I didn’t want to talk about it” stayed with me. When I realized the extent 
of the life and death paradox in the stories from my data collection, I wrote to Langer 
again asking if we can re-watch the tape. We sat yet again in his sun room listening to her 
description of death in life. 
 Langer explained to me how he changed his idea of “deathlife” to what he began 
to call “afterdeath,” of which we see themes in Delbo’s poem above. “Afterdeath” refers 
to the idea that a survivor feels trapped in the Holocaust, living freely but feeling dead, 
“dying there/a little more each day/dying over again.” Langer writes, 
Although Holocaust testimonies and memoirs are of course concerned 
with how one went on living in the midst of German atrocities, their 
subtexts offer us a theme that is more difficult to express or understand: 
how, under those minimal conditions, slowly but inexorably, one went on 
dying—every day, every hour, every minute of one’s agonizing existence. 
We are forced to redefine the meaning of survival, as the positive idea of 
	   134	  
stay alive is usurped by the negative one of fending off death. The impact 
on consciousness of this dilemma is a neglected but important legacy of 
the experience we call the Holocaust (Langer 2006:1). 
 
Langer’s Afterdeath encourages a post-Holocaust reconsideration of the idea of survival. 
The Holocaust proved that, for survivors, the concept of “living” did not separate fully 
from death; people could be alive and identify as dead. 
 I extend throughout my chapters this idea that life and death could not separate 
from one another during the Holocaust. In Chapter Four, “Doing Abortions…Saving 
Lives” I argue that survival for pregnant woman often depended on the abortion of their 
fetuses. Stories of women who had abortions in a variety of different but equally 
dangerous circumstances highlight the idea that survival for Jewish pregnant women 
depended on some version of death. Pinto, Soetendorp, and Shor all provide accounts that 
recognize the fact that their own vitality not only depended on Nazi actions, but also on 
the existence of their unborn children. Additional accounts from gynecologists like Perl 
and Klebanow confirm some Jewish beliefs that preservation of life first and foremost 
belongs to the pregnant mother, and if the fetus compromises her life she must have an 
abortion. Each of them, working for Nazis, performed many abortions throughout their 
time in concentration camps, because they knew these procedures saved the lives of many 
pregnant women. They believed the best chance of living came only after they terminated 
their pregnancies, and they encouraged many women to do so. 
 Chapter Five, “The Death Camp’s Birth Car” extends the life and death paradox 
of the Holocaust into stories of women who became pregnant and, instead of aborting, 
gave birth. I use Langer’s concept of “choiceless choice” to show how de Vries, 
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Bergman, and Polgar all gave birth in circumstances they would not have chosen for 
themselves in ordinary circumstances. Moreover, we have to eliminate all ways in which 
we construct ethics today to even have the ability to conceptualize the decisions they 
made—often make split decisions between life and death. Ruth’s interview confirms the 
challenges of being born into a situation of death, as her sister’s murder solidified the 
idea that Jewish children born into the Holocaust almost always died; literally, and 
metaphorically, pregnant women birthed into death. 
 Chapter Six, “Alternative Forms of Caregiving,” uses the life and death paradox 
to examine the changing roles of caregiving for mothers and doctors at this time. 
Pregnant women who died because of their “condition” experienced the life and death 
paradox at an intensely personal level. While men no doubt had their own encounters 
with life and death, this chapter argues that the experience of pregnancy highlights the 
life and death paradox in particularly women’s experiences. Presenting both sides of this 
ongoing academic debate helped frame the testimonies of Hena and Backer, both of 
whom offer stories in which ‘mothering’ evolved with the changing and increasingly 
dangerous circumstances of the Holocaust. Moreover, additional testimonies show how 
the role of doctors as caregivers also changed, and sometimes not for the better. Their 
lack of attention to pregnant Jewish women fueled danger in death and added to the 
extraordinary dilemma of pregnancy in the Holocaust. 
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Future Recommendations: A Call for Redefinitions 
Agency and Survival 
 
I highlight three key terms with my research question, mainly using the concepts 
of “agency” and “survival” to discuss stories of pregnancy and birth in the Holocaust. 
Many stories draw upon one of these terms above the others, or blend versions of them 
all; they leave us with the obligation to piece together these themes in the ways they 
intend. In this section, I want to address the reoccurring theme of agency—the 
exploration of “choice” I raise throughout many of the stories. 
Chapter One’s moment between Klebanow and his interviewer, in which he tells 
her she thinks “completely differently” from him by not realizing that his objective was 
to save the mothers and not the fetus, stands out to me as one of the most profound in this 
project. This exchange captures the extremity of the life and death paradox within stories 
of pregnancy in the Holocaust, but it also intensely demonstrates how we cannot assign 
words and meaning to this phenomenon easily today. I argue in this chapter that we do 
not have the language to discuss the concept of “choice” with regards to abortion in the 
Holocaust. 
I talk about the concepts of “choice” and “agency” differently in chapters one and 
two, though each argument helps us conceptualize both abortion and birth in the 
Holocaust. We can think about agency by revisiting how, in both situations, women who 
became pregnant did not “respond” so much as “react.” Women who became pregnant 
and had abortions did not always “choose” to have the abortions, but they reacted to 
circumstances when their conditions required them to do so. In birth situations, too, 
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women “reacted” to the dangerous environments. Chapter one therefore also draws upon 
the concept of “survival,” highlighting the fact that the term carries different meaning in 
different contexts. The stories of abortion reveal that, for many women, survival meant 
living—preserving their life. They do not reject abortion as a maltreatment of their 
fetuses, but some of them thank the abortions for preserving their lives and allowing them 
to care for children after the war. 
Chapter Two also conceptualizes agency with the help of Langer’s “choiceless 
choice,” which I use to frame Chapter Two. While women “reacted” in one way or 
another, the choices of reaction afforded to them were likely ones they would not have 
chosen for themselves in “normal” circumstances. “Choiceless choice” therefore refers to 
moments when women had to make decisions between scenarios that equally jeopardized 
their lives, and in the case of pregnancy, the lives of their children. But the term leaves 
room for the possibility of deliberation, and while these women may have considered 
their options, most of their circumstances lay far too out of their control. Anna Bergman, 
for example, signed away her child’s life before he was born because Nazis forced her to 
do so; she either signed the paper to kill her child or she herself would die. Neither 
outcome secured the safety and lives of her and her family, and showed how moments of 
life also involved death. Additional birth stories from Chapter Two demonstrate how 
women who had the ability to birth still did not have agency over her body or her child. 
These women therefore become strategic “agents” of their lives, however they 
can. They “choose life” by providing physical care and literal assistance, but they also 
survived by becoming “agents” of love in a setting where little love existed. 
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Care/giving and Love 
 In chapter six I add one more term, which we must redefine or broaden in order to 
understand the situations under which these women survived. For pregnant women to go 
through secretive abortion or birth procedures forced them to the literal point where life 
met death in the camps. We can learn from these stories—mostly from chapter six but 
also from the earlier stories—that care, life, and ‘mothering’ as clearly defined terms do 
not leave enough room for all the different expressions of caregiving which existed under 
these extreme conditions. The ways in which people love, and care, situate in the 
contexts, which these people live. In Holocaust concentration camps, “caring” and “love” 
became less about tending to those you knew personally and more about connecting with 
someone, in some way. These forged relationships encouraged an emotional support to 
which many women confirm lead to their survival. 
 This new notion of “caregiving” extends to the call for a broader understanding of 
“survival.” In some instances, “caregiving” meant having the abortion—not subjecting 
the unborn fetus to pneumonia, typhus, or the countless ways Nazis could kill them. But 
we see that “caregiving” also extended to the decisions women made about maintaining 
their pregnancies, to giving birth and raising their children in the terrible conditions they 
lived. Survival as a term, here, works around and with the notion of “caregiving,” 
determining what survival means depending on how the women acted as agents in 
creating their own forms of life. 
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Where Do We Go From Here? 
The value of this research lies in recognizing the lived experiences of pregnant 
women and their partners, the medical providers who attended to them, and their 
witnesses during the Holocaust. These informants have unique inside perspectives on not 
only their own in-the-moment responses to pregnancy under extreme conditions, but also 
can speak to larger issues of how the experience of seeking and obtaining abortion and 
other reproductive health care formed part of women’s and providers’ experiences of the 
Holocaust and its aftermath as aging adults in the Boston community. This research can 
contribute to the ongoing, urgent project of collecting and disseminating the survival 
stories of those who lived through the Holocaust, but it also adds to other research 
involving reproduction under duress.  
In current Western Culture we often talk about situations that do not have a 
choice. Many people make extremely difficult choices in all sorts of circumstances, or 
find themselves caught between two bad ones. We learn from the extreme – in this case, 
the Holocaust – what we can then apply to ordinary circumstances. Today, unfortunately, 
access to abortion or even justifying the need for one serves as “ordinary” circumstances. 
The women in the stories above teach us about ways in which women might become 
agents of their own bodies even with death as a possible circumstance; that only they 
know what is best for themselves and their families. We learn, too, that when pregnancy 
represents death, either in times of war or in individual, harmful circumstances, women 
find alternative ways to fight against it.  
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included interview transcription, coding of all data, identification of themes, and related 
application of theoretical analysis. Theories used include but are not limited to trauma 
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and memory studies, Holocaust studies, phenomenology, narrative studies. 
Thesis Title: Birthing into Death: Reproduction in the Holocaust (In progress) 
Boston University, Boston MA 
Affiliate Researcher, Elie Wiesel Center for Judaic Studies, January 2014-present 
Study aspects of Jewish culture and Holocaust studies to write as affiliate researcher for 
the Center; current work interests include Holocaust pedagogy, Holocaust survivor 
testimonies, and Jewish social action; Attend luncheons and conferences at Elie Wiesel 
Center for Judaic Studies as a representative researcher. 
 
Massachusetts Institute for Psychoanalysis, Boston MA 
Committee for Psychoanalysis and the Academy, committee member, October 2015-
Present 
Plan and assist in coordinating interdisciplinary events combining academic theories and 
practices with psychoanalysis; Currently developing a course with analysts and social 
scientists on childrearing in cross cultural contexts. 
 
Boston, Boston MA 
Intern and Docent, New England Holocaust Museum, Spring 2015-Present 
Plan and lead tours at the New England Holocaust Monument; meet and interact with 
survivors and students of varying levels in themes related to the Boston monument, 
memorialization, and Holocaust survivor stories; Revise docent training manual and 
Holocaust and update materials offered by the organization. Member of planning 
committee for Yom Hashoah: organize Boston-wide Spring memorial with organization 
and survivors. 
 
Brandeis University, Waltham MA 
Graduate Student Intern, Brandeis Osher Lifelong Learning Institute (BOLLI), Spring 
and summer semesters 2015 
Assist in daily maintenance of facilities; coordinate projects between administration and 
older adult members; engage with members and help assist in course development and 
future lectures. 
 
Jerusalem, Israel 
Volunteer, Amcha, August 2013 – December 2013 
Provide companionship to older adult Holocaust survivor; Attend group development 
workshops discussing concepts including but not limited to role of witness in Holocaust 
trauma and healing process/psychological aspect of Holocaust survivors; Attend 
organized events for Holocaust survivors and Amcha affiliates. 
 
Brandeis University, Waltham MA 
Teacher’s Assistant: Holocaust Representation in American Film and Literature, Fall 
2013 
Assist Fulbright Professor in teaching the subject of Holocaust Representation in 
American film and literature; work included: creating eyewitness videos through the 
	   149	  
Shoah foundation archives, creating slideshow presentations relating historical narrative 
to literary examples, reading and quoting articles and scholarship, watching and working 
with testimonial footage. 
 
Brandeis University, Waltham MA 
Anthropological Interview Study, Spring 2012-Spring 2013 
Study regarding perspectives of “successful aging” in American Jewish community: 
conducted interviews and other forms of ethnographic research amidst older adult 
community in Boston and Florida; co-taught older adult education classes; combined 
interviews and collected theory research with engaged participant observation to write 
publication. 
 
 
PUBLICATIONS AND PRESENTATIONS 
 
 
Rosenthal, Staci. 
2013 Maintenance of Individual Identity in Older Adulthood: Responses to Successful 
Aging in America. Student Anthropologist 3 (2): 183-193. ONLINE. 
http://studentanthropologist.wordpress.com/2013-student-anthropologist- 3-
2/maintenance-of-individual-identity-in-older-adulthood/ 
 
Rosenthal, Staci. 
2015 “It Can’t Have Been Normal”: Birth, Abortion, and Reproductive Healthcare 
During the Holocaust. American Anthropology Association. Paper, delivered November 
19, 2015, Denver CO. 
 
 
TEACHING EXPERIENCE 
 
 
Temple Shir Tikva, Wayland, MA 
High School Oral History Teacher, Current 
Create and teach lesson plans engaging High School students in basic aspects of Oral 
History by creating our own Oral History; Teach about Oral History and The Holocaust: 
testimonies and testimony theories, Historical versus Jewish approaches to studying the 
Holocaust, Holocaust and Israel connections. 
 
Temple Sinai, Brookline MA 
Sixth Grade Holocaust Teacher, Current 
Create and teach lesson plans engaging junior high students in basic aspects of the 
Holocaust, lessons involve themes pertaining but not limited to Eastern-European 
Judaism, Young-Adult Holocaust Novels, Historical Approaches to the Study of the 
Holocaust, Israel and Judaism Post-Holocaust, Social Justice. 
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ADDITIONAL SKILLS 
 
 
Intermediate reading and spoken fluency in Hebrew; Basic reading and oral 
comprehension of French 
